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Pursuant to Utah Appellate Rule 24(b), the Appellees, Armand L. Smith, 
individually and as Trustee and Virginia L. Smith, an individual ("Smiths"), 
herewith submit this Appellees' Brief answering the Opening Brief of Appellant, 
Utah State Treasurer, filed November 19, 2004. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL RAISED BY STATE TREASURER 
The issues in this appeal are those raised by the State Treasurer's Opening 
Brief, but the constitutional issues can be more accurately and precisely framed: 
1. Was the District Court Correct in Holding That the Punitive Damage 
Statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1(3) Is Unconstitutional Under the Utah 
and United States Constitutions As a "Taking" of the Smiths' 
Constitutionally Vested Property Rights in the June 29, 2001 Final 
Punitive Damage Judgment? 
a. Was the District Court Correct in Concluding that the Punitive 
Damage Statute § 78-18-1(3) (1989) Does Not Give the State 
Treasurer any Interest in the Punitive Damages Judgment, and 
that the State Treasurer's Claim to Fifty Percent of the Punitive 
Damage Award Did Not Mature and Was Not Triggered Until the 
Punitive Damage "Award" Was "Paid"? 
2. Although It Was Not Necessary for the District Court to Reach the 
Additional Constitutional Issues, Does the Punitive Damage Statute, Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-18-1(3) (1989) Also Violate the Separation of Powers 
Articles V and VIII of the Utah Constitution or the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution or Art. I, 
Sec. 24 of the Utah Constitution? 
3. Alternatively Only, if the State Treasurer is Found to be Entitled to a Net 
Fifty Percent of the Punitive Award, Is the State Treasurer Also Entitled 
to the $560,020 of Statutory Interest on the Judgment Against Price 
Development Co.? 
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The Smiths are in agreement with the State Treasurer that it has preserved 
each of these issues on appeal at the trial court and that the standard of review 
by this Court is one of correctness. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
DETERMINATIVE OF THIS APPEAL 
1. Punitive Damage Statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1(3) (1989), as 
originally enacted, annexed as Attachment 1. 
2. Utah Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 22, annexed as Attachment 2. 
3. United States Constitution, Fifth Amendment annexed as Attachment 3. 
4. New 2004 Punitive Damage Statute and Enrolled Bill, S.B. 201, annexed as 
Attachment 4. 
5. Utah Constitution, Art. V, Sec. 1, annexed as Attachment 5. 
6. Utah Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 24, annexed as Attachment 6. 
7. Utah Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 1 and Art. VIII, Sec. 7, annexed as 
Attachment 7. 
8. Fourteenth Amendment to United States Constitution annexed as 
Attachment 8. 
STATEMENT OF CASE AND UNDISPUTED FACTS 
This appeal is before this Court from the District Court's Rule 54(b) 
Summary Judgment Order of June 24, 2004 declaring Utah Code Ann § 78-18-
1(3) (1989) unconstitutional and unenforceable as a "taking," contrary to United 
States and Utah Constitutions, of the Smiths' constitutionally vested property 
rights in the compensatory and punitive damage judgment of the District Court 
dated June 29, 2001. In large part, the State Treasurer's Statement of the Case and 
2 
Facts are reasonably accurate as far as it goes, and the Smiths submit this 
Statement as a chronological supplement: 
1. On June 29, 2001 based upon a unanimous jury verdict, District Judge 
Noel entered judgment in favor of the Smiths and against Price 
Development Company (n/k/a/ Fairfax Realty Co.) of $1,100,000 
compensatory damages and $5,500,000 punitive damages: 
"IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED .. . 
4. That on the Special Verdict of the Jury Re: Punitive 
Damages for breach of fiduciary duty, judgment be, 
and the same is hereby entered, in favor of Armand L. 
Smith, individually and as Trustee for the Armand L. 
Smith, Jr. Trust and the Shannon S. Windham Trust, 
and Virginia L. Smiths, and against Price Development 
Company n/k/a Fairfax Realty, Inc. in the sum and 
amount of $5,500,000 . . . ." R. 4504. 
2. This Court, by unanimous decision of October 3, 2003, affirmed in all 
respects the June 29, 2001 judgment. R. 4559-4577. 
3. Price Development filed a certiorari petition in the United States Supreme 
Court on or about January 26, 2004, opposed by the Smiths, that was 
denied on March 29, 2004. R. 5309. This Court issued its Remittitur back 
to the trial court on the following day, March 30, 2004. R. 4592. 
4. Neither the State Treasurer nor the Attorney General attempted to 
intervene in the case at any time to assert any interest in the June 29, 2001 
judgment. Upon Smiths' Motion for Joinder filed in early April 2004, the 
District Court on April 14, 2004 joined the Utah State Treasurer as a Rule 
3 
19 Additional Defendant for purposes of determining the constitutionality 
of the punitive damage statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1(3) (1989). That 
section provides with respect to a punitive damage award: 
"in any judgment where punitive damages are awarded 
and paid, 50% of the amount of the punitive damages 
in excess of $20,000 shall, after payment of attorneys' 
fees and costs, be remitted to the state treasurer for 
deposit into the General Fund." 
5. Although § 78-18-1(3) (1989) was amended in other particulars in 1991 
and 2002, the Smiths and the State Treasurer agreed that the applicable 
statute at the date of judgment was the 1989 statute. State Br. @ 3, 5; R. 
5237, 5345. 
6. On April 14, 2004, the State Treasurer appeared orally before the District 
Court and asserted a net 50% interest, after attorneys' fees, in the punitive 
damage award, based upon § 78-18-1(3) (1989). The Smiths and the State 
Treasurer stipulated with Court approval that 50% of the punitive damage 
award (less $20,000) or $2,740,000, together with statutory interest on that 
portion of the punitive damage award, or $560,020, would be placed with a 
neutral depository pending a determination of the constitutionality of § 78-
18-1(3) (1989). R. 4695-4699. 
7. On April 30, 2004, the Smiths filed a motion for summary judgment 
against the State Treasurer to declare § 78-18-1(3) (1989) as 
unconstitutional and unenforceable; and alternatively, for the award of 
statutory interest on the judgment, upon the following legal bases: 
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(1) the entire June 29, 2001 punitive damage judgment vested on that date 
as a constitutional property right in the Smiths, with interest thereon, 
which they, alone, were entitled to enforce and recover against Price 
Development. Section 78-18-1(3) (1989) requiring that a net 50% of 
the punitive damage "award" be remitted to the State Treasurer when 
"paid" by Price Development, constituted a "taking" of Smiths' vested 
property rights in the judgment, contrary to the "Taking Clause" of the 
U. S. Constitution and Art. 1, Sec. 22 of the Utah Constitution; 
(2) Section 78-18-1(3) (1989) is unconstitutional as in violation of the 
Separation of Powers Articles, Art. V Sec. 1, and Art. VIII Sec. 1 and 7 
of the Utah Constitution which forbids the Legislature from 
diminishing, degrading or changing a final and vested judgment of the 
Judicial Branch; 
(3) Section 78-18-1(3) (1989) is discriminatory in attempting to set over to 
the State Treasurer 50% of a punitive damage judgment in a business 
fraud/breach of fiduciary duty case while not affecting settlements on 
statutory punitive damage judgments such as the State antitrust laws 
under § 76-10-919(l)(b)5 and therefore it denies to the Smiths the Equal 
Protection of the Law under the Utah and U. S. Constitutions; 
(4) alternatively, but in all events, even if § 76-18-1(3) (1989) were upheld, 
the Smiths were entitled to the interest on the judgment which was 
distinct from the "payment" of the punitive damage "award." 
5 
R. 5226-5229. 
8. Smiths' principal argument that § 78-18-1(1) (1989) was unconstitutional 
under the "Taking Clause" was predicated on the basis that the State 
Treasurer had only a claim to the punitive damage "award" and then not 
until it was "paid." "Payment" came years after the punitive damage 
judgment constitutionally vested as a guaranteed property right in the 
Smiths. R. 5242-5251. 
9. As evidence of the "taking" argument, the Smiths argued the likelihood 
that the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") would take the position that the 
entire $5,500,000 punitive damage judgment had vested in the Smiths and 
was taxable to them as ordinary income under the Alternative Minimum 
Tax ("AMT"), even if § 78-18-1(3) (1989) were upheld as constitutional 
and a net 50% of the judgment, viz., $2,740,000 was paid to the State 
Treasurer. Case precedent and Congressional proceedings suggest this 
result, which would be financially ruinous to the Smiths and emasculate 
the Utah legal policy of punitive damages. R. 5254-5257. 
10. In further support that § 78-18-1(3) (1989) was a "taking," the Smiths 
pointed to the 2004 amendment to § 78-18-1(3) (2004) by the Utah 
Legislature which, inter alia, made the State Treasurer, for the first time, 
a vested judgment creditor in any punitive damage judgment entered 
by a district court, with right to execute on the punitive judgment with 
"equal standing and footing" with the plaintiff judgment creditor. The 
6 
Smiths argued that the 2004 amendment was substantive and structural 
giving the State Treasurer for the first time a vested interest in the 
judgment. See Addendum 4; R. 5252-5254. 
11. The State Treasurer argued that under § 78-18-1(3) (1989), the punitive 
damage judgment was "divided" between the State Treasurer and the 
Smiths "at the time of the entry of judgment," that Smiths only became 
"vested" in 50% of the punitive damage judgment when entered and 
therefore, there was no "taking" of Smiths' vested rights in the judgment. 
R. 5350-5352. The Treasurer did not dispute that the State had no rights 
to enforce or execute on the judgment, and only addressed in passing the 
IRS federal income tax consequences of the vesting of 100% of the 
judgment in the Smiths. R. 5365. The Treasurer argued that the 2004 
amendment to § 78-18-1(3) (1989) by the Legislature was only a 
clarification and not a substantive change in the statute. R. 5364-5365. 
12. As to the alternative issue of interest on the punitive damage judgment, 
the Smiths argued that even if the punitive damage statute were upheld, 
the State's alleged interest did not trigger until the punitive damage award 
was paid. Accordingly, the Smiths were entitled in all events, to the 
statutory interest on the entire punitive damage judgment from entry to 
the date of payment against Price Development in favor of the Smiths. R. 
5274-5275. The State Treasurer opposed also this alternative motion. R. 
5365-5366. 
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13. After oral argument, District Judge Noel issued the court order granting 
summary judgment in favor of the Smiths and declaring § 78-18-1(3) 
(1989) unconstitutional in violation of the Taking Clauses of the Federal 
and State Constitutions. The Court in the written order stated: 
4. That the statute, § 78-18-1(3) (1989), as enacted in 
1989, on its face clearly does not give the State 
Treasurer or the State of Utah any interest in the 
Judgment of this Court when first issued, nor does it 
give the State any interest in the underlying cause of 
action. The State's interest is triggered when and if the 
punitive damage Judgment is "paid" to the payee, 
Judgment creditor in this case, the Smiths. To do as 
the State suggests, and rule that the statute gives the 
State an interest in the Judgment when first issued, 
would require this Court to read something into the 
statute that simply is not there. This the Court is 
unwilling to do. 
5. That the Smiths' property interests in the entire 
Judgment which are entitled to constitutional 
protection, vested in the Judgment as of the date of its 
entry on June 29, 2001. 
6. That Utah Code Ann., § 78-18-1(3), as enacted in 
1989, constitutes a "taking" by the State of Utah of the 
Smiths' vested property interests in the Judgment of 
this Court, which is prohibited by the Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution made 
applicable to the State through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, as well as Art I, Sec. 22 of the Utah 
Constitution. After having reached this conclusion, 
however, this Court makes no determination as to the 
constitutionality of Utah Code Ann., § 78-18-1(3), as 
amended by the 2004 Legislature." R. 5429-5430. 
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14. The District Court did not find it necessary to reach the Separation of 
Powers, the Equal Protection, or judgment interest arguments of Smiths' 
motion for summary judgment. R. 5430-5431. 
15. From the summary judgment order made final under Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(b), the State Treasurer takes this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The District Court order determining that Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1(3) 
(1989) was unconstitutional should be affirmed for essential constitutional 
reasons. The statute constitutes a "taking" of Smiths' constitutionally vested 
property rights in the final punitive damage judgment of the Court in violation of 
Article I, Sec. 22 of the Constitution of Utah and the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the United States Constitution. Additionally, the statute is 
constitutionally flawed in violation of the Separation of Powers, Article V and 
Article VIII of the Utah Constitution, and the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Federal and State Charters. 
The June 29, 2001 punitive damage judgment of $5,500,000 entered against 
Price Development and in favor of the Smiths only, was final, absolute, 
unqualified and unconditional. The Smiths are the judgment creditors in 100% of 
the punitive damage judgment which they enforced and defended against Price 
Development on appeal in this Court and on certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Section 78-18-1(3) (1989) attempts to require Smiths, years after the final 
judgment has vested in and been defended and enforced by Smiths, to remit 50% 
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of the punitive damage "award" to the State Treasurer if and when "paid" by Price 
Development to the Smiths. The conclusion is inescapable that the statute is 
conditional upon the hypothesis of payment long after the judgment 
constitutionally vested in the Smiths. While the cornerstone of constitutional 
analysis is the "vesting" of the property rights in the final judgment, the State 
Treasurer does not argue in this appeal that the final judgment ever vested in the 
Treasurer. Rather, he contends that the Smiths "only became vested in 50% of the 
final judgment" which judgment was somehow "divided" with the Treasurer when 
entered. The argument is a fiction that flies squarely in the face of the 
constitutional "taking" prohibitions of the Utah and Federal Constitutions above-
referenced. The final vested punitive damage judgment was and is a property right 
of the Smiths like any other property interest entitled to State and Federal 
constitutional guarantees. 
Added demonstration of the vesting of the full and final punitive damage 
judgment in the Smiths is the distinct possibility that the Internal Revenue Service, 
following established precedent, will tax, under the Alternative Minimum Tax, the 
entire punitive damage judgment to the Smiths. If § 78-18-1(3) (1989) were held 
constitutional herein, and the I.R.S. taxed the Smiths on the full judgment as it has 
in other cases, the result would not only be financially ruinous to the Smiths, but it 
would also scuttle this Court's legal policy on punitive damages. 
In its recently concluded 2004 Session, the Utah Legislature fundamentally 
changed § 78-18-1(3) (1989) to read the way the Treasurer would like to but 
10 
cannot now construe the 1989 statute. Section 78-18-1(3) (2004), for the first 
time, makes the State Treasurer a judgment creditor of a post-May 2004 punitive 
damage judgment on equal footing with the plaintiff to execute upon, enforce, and 
settle the judgment. The 2004 statute is an open acknowledgement of the 
constitutional defects in § 78-18-1(3) (1989) before this Court. In fact, the 
Treasurer's appeal in this case essentially asks this Court to rewrite § 78-18-1(3) 
(1989) so it reads as does § 78-18-1(3) (2004). The District Court expressly 
declined to judicially amend the statute. 
Section 78-18-1(3) (1989) is also constitutionally flawed in violation of the 
Separation of Powers Articles V and VIII of the Utah Constitution. At stake is the 
strength, veracity and integrity of a final judgment of the Judicial Branch. The law 
is firmly settled that the final punitive damage judgment herein vested in the 
Smiths is the supreme act, the sine qua non, of the Judicial Department and it may 
not be diluted, degraded, abrogated, or changed by the legislature. Section 78-18-
1(3) (1989) is unconstitutional for attempting to do just that. 
Further, § 78-18-1(3) (1989) will not stand constitutional scrutiny under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Utah and Federal Constitutions. The statute 
unconstitutionally discriminates against those who recover a non-statutory 
punitive damage judgment for deceit and breach of fiduciary duty and intentional 
partnership asset conversion, vis-a-vis, those who obtain a statutory punitive 
damage judgment in the form of treble damages for violation of Utah's antitrust 
laws or other statutory punitive damage statutes. 
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Lastly, and only in the alternative, were this Court to reverse and uphold 
the constitutionality of § 78-18-1(3) (1989), the Smiths would still be entitled to 
the statutory interest payable by Price Development on the entire punitive damage 
judgment, no part of which ever vested in the State Treasurer. At best, the 
Treasurer's entitlement is only to a net 50% of the punitive damage "award," if 
and when "paid." It is only the punitive damage judgment, and not the "award" 
which carries statutory interest. 
A R G U M E N T 
I. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(3) (1989) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
AND UNENFORCEABLE AS A "TAKING" OF THE SMITHS' 
CONSTITUTIONALLY VESTED RIGHTS IN THE FINAL JUNE 29, 
2001 PUNITIVE DAMAGE JUDGMENT, IN VIOLATION OF THE 
UTAH AND UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS. 
1. The June 29, 2001 Judgment Vested a Constitutional Property Right in 
the Smiths to the Entire Punitive Damage Judgment Including 
Interest. 
The State Treasurer's statement is correct that the constitutional 
interpretation of a statute is ordinarily to be gauged by its plain meaning.1 (App. 
Br. at 9). However, "[i]t is of course true that a law that impinges upon a 
fundamental right explicitly or implicitly secured by the Constitution is 
presumptively unconstitutional." City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 76 
(1980) (citations omitted). 
1
 While indirectly referencing legislative history, the Treasurer states emphatically 
that § 78-18-1(3) (1989) is not ambiguous and is to be interpreted by its plain 
meaning. State Br. @ 10. The Smiths agree. State v. Casey, 2002 UT 29 ^ 20. 
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In the constitutional context, it is undeniable that the Smiths' property 
interests vested in the entire punitive damage judgment when it was entered on 
June 29, 2001. The judgment was indivisible, entered only in favor of and to be 
enforced by the Smiths, and was constitutionally protected property as much as 
any other real or personal property right. The punitive damage judgment "is as 
much an article of property as anything else that a party owns." State of 
Louisiana, ex rel. v. Mayor and Administrators of the City of New Orleans, 109 
U.S. 285, 291 (1883). That property right in the entire judgment could have been 
executed upon only by the Smiths, and sold, assigned or mortgaged by them in the 
same way as other real or personal property. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. 
City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102, 
123-24 (1898); Gilroy v. Lowe, 626 P.2d 469, 472 (Utah 1981). 
When the judgment was entered in favor of the Smiths and against Price 
Development on June 29, 2001, nothing else, in fact or law, was required as a 
condition to the Smiths' constitutional vesting in the judgment. The integrity of 
that final judgment, as affirmed by this Court, is collaterally attacked by the State 
Treasurer's argument in this appeal that only 50% of the punitive damage 
judgment vested in the Smiths in consequence of § 78-18-1(3) (1989). That claim 
came as a surprise to the District Court which found not only that the State 
Treasurer is not named or anywhere to be found, even impliedly, in the judgment, 
but also that both the punitive damage judgment and the statute would have to be 
rewritten to say what they plainly do not say. 
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The very integrity of final judgments in the State of Utah is in jeopardy in 
this appeal. This Court has stated that a final judgment is an act of the Judicial 
Department which is the absolute disposition of the rights of the interested parties: 
"A judgment or decree duly entered, establishes in the most 
authentic form, that which had theretofore been in dispute, or 
unsettled or uncertain. . . . Since the parties submitted to the court 
the resolution of their disputes and the determination of their rights 
and liabilities, that resolution when entered as a judgment 
conclusively binds them. Such questions may not again be litigated; 
they have been adjudicated for all time, and are fused into the 
judgment or decree." 
Adams v. Davies, 156 P.2d 207, 209 (Utah 1945). "A judgment is the final 
determination of the rights of the parties." Lukich v. Utah Construction Co., 150 
P.2d 298 (Utah 1915). 
"[T]he finality of a judgment must be respected in order to insure the 
rights of parties. . . . Litigation must be put to an end, and it is the 
function of a final judgment to do just that. A judgment is the final 
consideration and determination of a court on matters submitted to it 
in an action or proceeding." 
Crofts v. Crofts. 445 P.2d 701, 702 (Utah 1968). "If the language of judgment is 
clear and unambiguous, it must be enforced as it speaks." Park City Utah 
Corporation v. Ensign Company, 586 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1978). 
The constitutionally protected property rights of Smiths in the final June 29, 
2001 Judgment cannot be taken or damaged by the State Treasurer without 
compensation. Both the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, made 
applicable to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment, Penn Central 
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Transportation Co., 438 U.S. at 122, and Article I, Sec. 22 of the Utah 
Constitution contain a simple but eloquent prohibition: 
" . . . nor shall private property be taken for a public use, without just 
compensation." 
Fifth Amendment, U.S. Constitution. 
"Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use 
without just compensation." 
Art. I, Sec. 22, Utah Constitution. 
The finality of the judgment, vesting in Smiths the rights of the judgment 
creditor who has obtained the judgment, may not by prior or subsequent statute of 
the Legislature be taken away, diminished, degraded or eliminated. The United 
States Supreme Court in the early case of McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102, 
123-24 (1898), stated the now long-recognized rule: 
"It is not within the power of a legislature to take away rights which 
have been once vested by a judgment. Legislation may act on 
subsequent proceedings, may abate actions pending, but when these 
actions have passed into judgment the power of the legislature to 
disturb the rights created thereby ceases." 
Id. at 123-24. The rule in McCullough is embedded in the law governing the 
constitutional rights of the Smiths before this Court and it has echoed down 
through the years.2 In Johnston v. CIGNA Corp., Inc., 14 F.3rd 486 (10th Cir. 
2
 Not only do rights that have become vested by a judgment constitute property 
"protected from legislative interference," but an attachment or lien "entitling a 
creditor to resort to property for the satisfaction of a claim is a property right 
protected by the Fifth Amendment." United States v. Board of Educ. of City of 
Chicago, 588 F.Supp. 132, 235 (N.D. 111. 1984). 
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1993), cert, denied 514 U.S. 1082 (1995), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
recognized the validity of the doctrine: 
"The nature of the vested rights doctrine is twofold. The doctrine 
has a due process component premised upon the acknowledgment 
that once rights are fixed by judgment, they are a form of property 
over which the legislature has no greater power than it has over any 
other form of property. Axel Johnson v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 6 
F.3d 78 (2nd Cir. 1993); Tonya K. v. Board of Educ., 847 F.2d 1243, 
1247-48 (7th Cir. 1988); see also, Taxpayers for A nimus-La Plata 
Referendum v. Animus-La Plata Water Conservancy, 739 F.2d 1472, 
1477 (10th cir. 1984) ("the TSupremel Court has indicated that it 
would not allow a legislature to interfere with an adjudicated right"). 
In cases involving Congress and the federal judiciary, the vested 
rights doctrine also has a separation of power component which 
prevents Congress from sitting as a 'court of errors' with the powers 
to suspend or revise final judgments of the federal courts." (Some 
citations omitted). 
Id. at 490-491 (emphasis added). 
The Tenth Circuit in Johnston went on to cite with approval McCullough in 
stating: 
"The case perhaps most often cited for the vested rights doctrine is 
McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102, 123-24, 43 L.Ed. 382\ 19 S. 
Ct. 134 (1898), in which the Supreme Court held that the Legislature 
lacks the power to take away rights that have been vested by final 
judgment." 
Id. at 491. The Tenth Circuit then stated the accepted principle: 
"In fact, the Court has reiterated the vested rights principle 
underlying McCullough on several occasions. See, e.g., Chicago & 
Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U. S. 
103, 113, 92 L. Ed. 568, 68 S. Ct. 431 (1948) ('judgments within the 
powers vested in [Article Three] courts. . . may not be unlawfully 
revised, overturned or refused faith and credit by another 
Department of Government5); Hodges v. Snyder, 261 U. S. 600, 603, 
67 L. Ed. 819, 43 S.Ct. 435 (1923) ('the private rights of parties 
which have been vested by the judgment of a court cannot be taken 
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away by subsequent legislation, but must be thereafter enforced by 
the court regardless of such legislation'); Stephens v. Cherokee 
Nation, 174 US 445, 478, 43 L.Ed. 1041, 19 S Ct. 722 (1899) ('it is 
undoubtedly true that legislatures cannot set aside the judgments of 
courts'); United States v. O'Grady, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 641, 647-48, 
22 L.Ed. 772 (1875) (invalidating attempt by Congress to revise a 
final judgment entered by the Court of Claims because 'where no 
appeal is taken to [Supreme Court], [such judgments] are,, under 
existing laws, absolutely conclusive of the rights of the parties, 
unless a new trial is granted by [Claims] court')' Pennsylvania v. 
Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (1 How.) 421, 431, 15 
L.Ed. 435 (1855) ('[an] act of Congress cannot have the effect and 
operation to annul the judgment of the court already rendered or the 
rights determined thereby'); Massingill v. Downs, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 
760, 768, 12 L.Ed 903 (1849) ('no legislative act can change the 
rights and liabilities of parties which have been established by 
solemn judgment')." 
Id. at 491. 
The property rights of the individual, as vested in the final judgment here, 
have high constitutional priority before this Court and the United States Supreme 
Court. BertagnoH v. Baker, 215 P.2d 626, 628 (1950); Movie et al. v. Salt Lake 
City, 176 P.2d 882, 885(1947). 
"[A]ll history shows that rights of persons are unsafe where property 
is insecure. Protection to one goes with protection to the other; and 
there can be neither prosperity nor progress where this foundation of 
all just government is unsettled. . . ." 
Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 767 (1879). It cannot be disputed, in law, that 
on June 29, 2001 the Smiths, and only the Smiths, became vested as the judgment 
creditor in the final judgment. 
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2. Under Sec. 78-18-1(3) (1989), the State Treasurer's Entitlement to Any 
Punitive Damage Award Does Not Arise Until and is Only Triggered 
By an "Award" Being "Paid." 
The State Treasurer argues that the plain meaning under the statute is that 
the Treasurer obtains an interest in a net 50% of punitive damages "where 
awarded and paid" with the monies to be remitted to the State Treasurer for 
general fund use. State Br. @ 10-11. The problem with the Treasurer's argument 
is that the statute plainly does not say either what the Treasurer would like it to 
say or what it must say in order for the Treasurer's argument to succeed. The 
section clearly contemplates an entitlement to a punitive damage award, not 
judgment, but only if the punitive award is ever paid. The section states: 
"In any judgment where punitive damages are awarded and paid, 
50% of the amount of the punitive damages in excess of $20,000 
shall, after payment of attorneys' fees and costs, be remitted to the 
state treasurer for deposit into the General Fund." (Emphasis added 
and bolded). 
§78-18-1(3) (1989). 
Troubling questions plague the Treasurer's arguments, the answers of 
which unravel his position. To begin with, when does the Treasurer claim that its 
50% interest "vested"? Also, vested in what? As to the first query, the Treasurer 
admits that the statute is silent and, in fact, contains no language as to when he 
acquires his claimed 50% interest in the judgment. State Br. @ 11. Nowhere in 
the Treasurer's Brief does he claim (much less explain when or how) the 
Treasurer's interest ever "vested." 
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As to the second query, there are no vested rights of the Treasurer in any 
judgment at any time, but only at some unknown future date and then only if a 
punitive damage award is paid. In order for a property right or interest to vest in a 
judgment of a court in Utah, there must be no other condition or hypothesis to be 
satisfied before the interest can vest. A future and speculative interest does not 
rise or equate to a present, vested right. State of Arizona v. Estes Corp., 558 P.2d 
714, 716 (Ariz. App. Ct. 1976) ("rights are not vested if they are qualified by 
contingencies"); Vaughn v. Nadel & Gussman Partnership, 618 P.2d 778, 783 
(Kan. 1980) ("a vested right is a right so fixed that it is not dependent on any 
future act, contingency or decision to make it more secure."). 
Still other questions undercut the State Treasurer's position. If, as the 
Treasurer argues, the Smiths' property rights constitutionally vested in only 50% 
of the final punitive damage judgment, how could the Smiths enforce against Price 
Development by threatened execution, and then defend on appeal, 100% of the 
punitive damage judgment? Could the State Treasurer, under § 78-18-1(3) (1989), 
enforce by execution or defend on appeal the claimed net 50% of the punitive 
judgment against Price Development? If Price Development had attempted to 
discharge the punitive damage judgment in bankruptcy, would the State Treasurer 
have been entitled to enforce the judgment as a creditor of Price Development? 
Was the Treasurer ever a judgment creditor of Price Development? 
Hypothetically, if the Smiths agreed to settle the case with Price Development for 
the amount of the compensatory damages and waived the punitive damage 
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judgment, would the State Treasurer have had the right to block the settlement and 
enforce its claimed interest against the judgment debtor, Price Development? If 
not in the Smiths, where is this second 50% interest in the punitive damage 
judgment vested? Surely not in the Treasurer for the reasons already advanced. 
Was the 50% interest placed in a black void or in perpetual animated suspension? 
These questions will not go away. 
In point of law, § 78-18-1(3) (1989) and the vested rights doctrine 
established more than a century ago compel the conclusion that the State Treasurer 
never became vested in the punitive damage judgment of the District Court. 
Rather, the Treasurer only becomes entitled under the statute to a net 50% punitive 
damage "award" when and if "paid." That attempted entitlement is conditional 
and a hypothesis that has nothing to do with the Smiths' constitutionally vested 
rights in the entire June 29, 2001 punitive damage judgment. The Legislature did 
not provide in § 78-18-1(3) (1989), as it could have, that the Treasurer would be 
named as a judgment creditor in the punitive damage judgment as was done in the 
2004 legislation. 
In order for the State Treasurer to prevail he must ask this Court to rewrite 
78-18-1(3) (1989) to say what the Legislature clearly did not say. This Court 
should decline that request just as the experienced District Judge declined herein. 
See Order of Noel, J. 1f 4; R. 5427-5432. 
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3. Case Precedent Supports the Unconstitutionality of §78-18-lf3) (1989) 
As a "Taking" of Smiths9 Vested Rights in the Punitive Damage 
Judgment. 
The constitutional difficulties facing § 78-18-1(3) (1989) are strikingly 
comparable to the Colorado punitive damage statute struck down by the Colorado 
Supreme Court in Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co., 818 P.2d 262, 273 (Colo. 1991). 
In Kirk, a 1987 punitive damage statute in Colorado provided that one-third of all 
punitive damages awarded be payable to the state general fund when those 
damages were "collected." Just as with § 78-18-1(3) (1989), the Colorado statute, 
C.R.S. § 13-21-102 (4) (1987), did not vest the State of Colorado with any interest 
in the punitive damage judgment, but rather set forth that the state was entitled to 
one-third of a final judgment (by definition already vested in the private plaintiff), 
and then only if and when the "punitive damages," were "collected."3 The 
Colorado statute read: 
"One-third of all reasonable damages collected pursuant to this 
section shall be paid into the state general fund. The remaining two-
thirds of such damages collected shall be paid to the injured party. 
Nothing in this subsection (4) shall be construed to give the general 
fund any interest in the claim for exemplary damages or in the 
litigation itself at any time prior to payment becoming due." 
C.R.S. § 13-21-102(4) (1987) (emphasis added). 
The Colorado Supreme Court, in concluding that the Colorado statute 
worked a "taking" of the plaintiffs constitutionally vested property rights in the 
3
 It is noteworthy that the Utah statute, § 78-18-1(3) (1989) was enacted only two 
years after the Colorado statute in Kirk. 
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punitive damage judgment, began its analysis by stating that a vested interest in a 
judgment of a court is a property right protected as any other property interest: 
". . . The term 'property9 also includes the judgment itself, which 
creates an independent legal right to full satisfaction from the 'goods 
and chattels, lands, tenements, and real estate of every person against 
whom any judgment is obtained.5 . . . [S]ee generally, Evans v. City 
of Chicago, 689 F.2d 1286, 1296 (7th Cir. 1982) (final judgment no 
longer subject to modification is vested property right); Truax-Traer 
Coal Co. v. Compensation Cornm'r., 17 S.E.2d 330, 334 (W.Va. 
1941) (judgment is 'property5 and as such is proper subject of 
constitutional protection55). 
818 P.2d at 267 (emphasis added). 
The Kirk Court went on to hold that the punitive damage judgment was not 
only indivisible and part of the compensatory damage judgment to which the State 
of Colorado had no interest, but also the Colorado statute was a forced 
contribution imposed not on the wrongdoer defendant, but rather upon the plaintiff 
who suffered the wrongdoing: 
"As we previously observed, while a judgment for exemplary 
damages is designed to punish the wrongdoer and deter similar 
conduct by others, it is only available when a civil wrong has been 
committed under extremely aggravating circumstances and when the 
injured party has a successful claim for actual damages against the 
wrongdoer. Harding Glass Co., Inc., 640 P.2d at 1123 at 1126-27. 
In that sense, an exemplary damages award is not totally devoid of 
any and all reparative elements. More importantly, the forced 
contribution of one-third of the exemplary damages judgment is 
imposed not on the defendant wrongdoer who caused the Injuries but 
upon the plaintiff who suffered the wrong. It goes without saying 
that placing the burden of payment on the judgment creditor who 
suffered the wrong bears no reasonable relationship to any arguable 
goal of punishing the wrongdoer or deterring others from engaging 
in similar conduct.55 
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Id. at 270 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Utah agrees. Crookston v. Fire 
Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 806 (Utah 1991) (compensatory and punitive 
damages have nexus with respect to the egregiousness of the misconduct, the 
impact upon the plaintiff, the ratio of compensatory to punitive damages, and the 
relationship between the parties (fiduciary in this case)). 
Turning to the issue of constitutionally vested rights, the Colorado Supreme 
Court cited the landmark case of McCullough, supra, as well as a string of other 
cases in holding: 
"Where a private property interest emanates from a final judgment, 
the long-standing rule, announced by the Supreme Court in 
McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102, 123-24 (1898), and 
consistently followed by other courts, is that such a property interest 
cannot be diminished by legislative fiat . . . [quoting McCullough 
and other cases]. " 
Id. at 268 (emphasis added). Concluding that the taking of a money judgment 
from a vested judgment creditor is "substantially equivalent to the taking of money 
itself (id. at 269), the Colorado Court struck down the Colorado statute as a 
"taking" violative of the Colorado and Federal Constitutions: 
"We thus conclude that section 13-21-102(4) constitutes a taking of 
a judgment creditor's private property interest in an exemplary 
damages award without just compensation in violation of the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 
Article II, section 15, of the Colorado Constitution." 
Id. at 273. 
The statute in Kirk is clearly comparable to § 78-18-1(3) (1989) because 
the punitive "damages" in Kirk are synonymous with "award" in Utah, and the 
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entitlement thereto is conditional upon being "collected" in Kirk and "paid" in 
Utah. The State Treasurer attempts to distinguish the holding in Kirk on the basis 
that the Colorado Court cited the phrase in the Colorado statute: "[njothing in 
subsection (4) shall be construed to give the general fund any interest in the claim 
for exemplary damages or in the litigation itself at any time prior to payment 
becoming due." A fair reading of the Kirk decision, however, demonstrates that 
the Treasurer's claim is meritless. The Colorado Supreme Court reached its 
conclusions in Kirk squarely on a comprehensive and well-reasoned analysis of 
the "Taking Clauses" of the State and Federal Constitutions, quite independently 
of the disclaimer in the last sentence of C.R.S. § 13-21-102(4) (1987). The focus 
of the Kirk Court was the vesting and the time of the vesting of the plaintiff, Kirk, 
in the punitive damage judgment, vis-a-vis the Colorado statute which entitled the 
State to a third of all damages when and if collected. In the 7-page Kirk opinion, 
the Colorado Supreme Court mentions the disclaimer sentence only in passing as 
an "add-on" type statement for its already-reached conclusion that the plaintiff had 
a constitutionally vested property interest in the punitive damage judgment. Id. at 
267, 272. For convenience, a copy of the Kirk Opinion is annexed as Attachment 
9. 
The 1989 Utah Punitive Damage Statute, § 78-18-1(3) (1989) substantively 
matches the 1987 Colorado statute, C.R.S. § 13-21-102(4) (1987) and makes the 
Kirk decision highly persuasive as to the "taking" issue before this Court. Just as 
the District Court below concluded, the Colorado Court in Kirk determined that it 
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did not have to reach the constitutional Separation of Powers and Equal Protection 
arguments because of its conclusion that the "Taking Clauses" rendered the 
comparable Colorado statute unconstitutional. 
II. IN THE 2004 LEGISLATIVE SESSION, THE UTAH LEGISLATURE 
RADICALLY CHANGED § 78-18-1(3) (1989), WHICH MAY HAVE 
REMOVED THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEFECT UNDER THE 
"TAKINGS" CLAUSE WHICH IS NOW BEFORE THE COURT. 
In the 2004 session of the Utah Legislature, Section 78-18-1(3) (1989) was 
amended to introduce new substantive provisions that demonstrably changed the 
structure and vesting of the interest of the plaintiff obtaining a punitive damage 
judgment, as well as providing for a new interest of the State Treasurer in said 
judgment. The new statute, § 78-18-1(3) (2004), as well as a copy of the Enrolled 
Bill, S.B. 201, are annexed to this Brief as Attachment 4. While the 2004 statute 
is not retroactive or applicable to this case, it could not have been scripted better to 
highlight the Legislature's recognition of the constitutional infirmities in § 78-18-
1(3) (1989) before this Court. A side-by side comparison of the 1989 and 2004 
statutes is illustrative: 
§ 78-18-1(3) (1989) 
"In any judgment where punitive 
damages are awarded and paid, 50% 
of the [net punitive damages] shall . 
. . be remitted to the state treasurer 
for deposit into the General Fund." 
(Emphasis added.) 
§ 78-18-1(3) (2004) 
Amended. The word "paid" is 
repealed. 
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No similar provision. 
No similar provision. 
"(a) In any case where punitive 
damages are awarded, the judgment 
shall provide that 50°/o of the [net 
punitive damages] shall . . . be 
remitted by the judgment debtor to 
the state treasurer for deposit into 
the General Fund." (Emphasis 
added.) 
No similar provision. "(c) The state shall have all rights 
due a judgment creditor until the 
judgment is satisfied, and stand on 
equal footing with the judgment 
creditor of the original case in 
securing a recovery." 
No similar provision. "Unless all affected parties, 
including the state, expressly agree 
otherwise or the application is 
contrary to the terms of the 
judgment, any payment on the 
judgment by or on behalf of any 
judgment debtor, whether voluntary 
or by execution or otherwise, shall 
be applied in the following order: 
(i) compensatory damages, and any 
applicable attorneys fees and costs; 
(ii) the initial $20,000 punitive 
damages; and finally 
(iii) the balance of the punitive 
damages." 
As the Court can readily determine, there are fundamental, substantive 
changes in the 2004 statute: 
• Under § 78-18-l(3)(a) (2004), every punitive damage judgment thereafter 
entered in Utah "shall provide" that 50% of the net punitive damages, after 
$20,000 and actual and reasonable attorney's fees and costs are deducted, is 
to be remitted to the State Treasurer. Thus under the 2004 statute, the 
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Treasurer's interest is recognized in the judgment when it is entered, vis-a-
vis the 1989 statute in which the Treasurer's entitlement arises only and if a 
punitive damage "award" is actually "paid." 
• It is the punitive damage judgment debtor under the 2004 statute who must 
pay the net 50% of the punitive damage judgment to the State Treasurer, 
vis-a-vis the 1989 statute before the Court in which the burden and onus 
rests upon the plaintiff judgment creditor after payment is received from the 
judgment debtor; 
• The words "paid" and punitive damages "awarded" in the 1989 statute have 
been repealed under § 78-18-l(3)(a) (2004), further attaching the vesting 
time of the Treasurer's interest to the entry of the punitive damage 
"judgment" vis-a-vis the payment of the award; 
• Under § 78-18-l(3)(c) (2004), the State Treasurer, totally unlike the 1989 
statute, has full rights of a judgment creditor who can immediately execute 
upon and enforce the punitive damage judgment until satisfied, and in so 
doing "stands on equal footing with the judgment creditor" who secured the 
punitive damage judgment. Thus, under the 2004 version, the State 
Treasurer has standing to pursue the judgment upon execution, and in 
bankruptcy, if necessary, defend an appeal, and for settlement purposes 
stands on equal footing with the punitive damage plaintiff. In the 1989 
statute before the Court, the State Treasurer has no such standing; 
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• Under the new § 78-18-l(3)(d) (2004), the State is listed as an "affected 
party" whose agreement must be obtained if the payment of a judgment, 
including punitive damages, is made in any way other than a priority of 
compensable damages first, actual attorney's fees and costs, second, the 
initial $20,000 of punitive damages third, and punitive damages fourth. 
The Treasurer has no such rights under § 78-18-1(3) (1989), under which 
the punitive damage judgment plaintiff and defendant may compromise or 
even waive the punitive damage judgment. 
The Treasurer argues that § 78-18-1(3) (2004) was a mere "clarification" of 
the language in the 1989 statute and did not constitute a substantive change (State 
Br. @ 13) while making the candid admission that "[a]mendments to statutes are 
generally presumed to indicate a legislative intent to change existing legal rights." 
State Br. @ 14. Contrary to the Treasurer's argument, the 2004 changes to § 78-
18-1(3) (1989) are not simply a stylistic or clarifying facelift. They constitute a 
heart transplant, fundamentally changing the rights of the punitive damage 
plaintiff in the final judgment, as well as providing for the first time rights of the 
State Treasurer in that judgment. Section 78-18-1(3) (2004) draws a "bright-line" 
under the constitutional flaws in § 78-18-1(3) (1989) in effect at the entry of the 
June 29, 2001 punitive damage judgment. 
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III. THE ACT OF VESTING OF THE ENTIRE JUNE 29, 2001 PUNITIVE 
DAMAGE JUDGMENT IN THE SMITHS MAY WELL SUBJECT 
THEM TO FEDERAL INCOME TAX LIABILITY, UNDER THE 
ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX, REGARDLESS OF THE 
TREASURER'S CLAIM. 
Because the full June 29, 2001 punitive damage judgment of $5,500,000 in 
this case constitutionally vested in the Smiths as of that date, there is a major 
concern that the U. S. Commissioner of Internal Revenue ("I.R.S.") will take the 
position that the entire punitive damage judgment is taxable to the Smiths under 
the alternative minimum tax (sometimes "AMT") even if § 78-18- 1(3) (1989) is 
determined constitutional and a net $2,740,000 less actual attorneys5 fees and 
costs, were to be remitted to the State Treasurer. While this certainly is not a 
result to which the Smiths would admit, it is an issue that reflects upon and is a 
real consequence of the vesting of the entire punitive damage judgment in the 
Smiths. Moreover, it absolutely cuts against the State Treasurer's argument that 
the final punitive damage judgment was divided upon entry on June 29, 2001 and 
that the Smiths' property rights only vested in 50% of that judgment. 
There can be no doubt that the I.R.S., supported by tax court decisions, has 
assessed income tax liability based on the AMT upon taxpayers who have 
recovered punitive damages on the portion paid to the state under state statute. In 
Banatis v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 340 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. 
granted on attorney's fees, 124 S.Ct. 1712 (2004) U.S. LEXIS 2384, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the U. S. Tax Court holding that 
economic and punitive damage awards are includable in gross income of the 
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taxpayer, under the AMT, including part of the punitive damages paid to the State 
of Oregon to settle Oregon's claim under the state punitive damage statute. 
The Tax Court had earlier held in Banatis v. Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue, 2002 Tax Ct. Memo. LEXIS 4, ^ 9, that under the AMT, attorney's fees 
paid under a 40% contingency fee agreement applicable to both compensatory and 
punitive damages, as well as all of the punitive damages, including that part paid 
to the State of Oregon, were includable within the taxpayer's gross income 
without deduction. Id. at 20. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed as to 
the contingent attorney's fees paid to the plaintiffs lawyers, but affirmed the tax 
court as to the total punitive damages including that portion paid to the State of 
Oregon. Banatis at 1093. After reviewing the policy of the Alternative Minimum 
Tax Statute, the Ninth Circuit held: 
"We affirm the judgment of the Tax Court that the economic and 
punitive damage awards are includable in gross income and that the 
alternative minimum tax was constitutionally applied in this case. 
We reverse the judgment of the Tax Court as to the inclusion of 
attorneys fees in the taxpayer's gross income." 
Id. (emphasis added). The Banatis decision is before the U. S. Supreme Court on 
certiorari regarding the Ninth Circuit's reversal as to attorney's fees against the 
I.R.S. 
In a noted tax news commentary published by Tax Analysts TM on July 18, 
2003, Robert W. Wood, author of Taxation of Damage Awards and Settlement 
Payments, 2nd Ed. 1998 (2001 Supplement) wrote regarding the proposed 2003 
Senate Bill, Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act 2003: 
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UA last-minute amendment to the Senate Bill, introduced by Senator 
Orrin Hatch, R-Utah, dealt with punitive damage awards and is 
worth noting. The Hatch-Amendment indicated that even though 
punitive damages are now always taxable to the recipient (and that 
was made clear back in 1996), a plaintiff will not be taxable on any 
punitive damages that must be paid to a State under a so-called 
'split-award statute.' Many states require that in a civil action where 
punitive damages are paid to a private party, the state automatically 
gets a 50% cut. In such a state, this clarification makes clear that 
even though the punitives received by the plaintiff will be taxable to 
the plaintiff, those going to the state will not." 
The Hatch proposed amendment never made it out of the Senate 
Committee, much less was considered by the full Senate or the House of 
Representatives. 2003, Tax Analysts, Tax Notes Today, July 22, 20O3. 
The Treasurer's Brief attempts to twist and distort this issue contending that 
the Smiths argued to the District Court the "fairness" of the AMT treatment of a 
punitive damage judgment, whereas "fairness" is irrelevant in considering the 
constitutionality of § 78-18-1(3) (1989). State Br. @19. The Treasurer misses the 
whole point: that the I.R.S. position, the Tax Court decisions, the Banatis 
precedent, and the unsuccessful Hatch amendment all underscore the principle 
that, as in this case, the plaintiffs' constitutional property rights vest in a punitive 
damage judgment and the consequences of that vesting subject the 
plaintiff/taxpayer to tax liability on the full punitive damage judgment, even if a 
net 50% of the punitive award is years later remitted to the State Treasurer. 
Constitutionally, it is not a matter of fairness, but rather the pragmatic recognition 
of the brutal reality of the Treasurer's erroneous argument in this case. 
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The issue is also relevant because if § 78-18-1(3) (1989) were upheld as 
constitutional and the Smiths were required to pay ordinary income tax on the net 
50% remitted to the Treasurer, the result would wipe out virtually all recovery by 
the Smiths of any part of the punitive damage judgment, bestowing an absolute 
windfall upon the Treasurer. Most importantly, such a result would emasculate 
much of the legal policy underlying punitive damages in this State, including the 
incentive of Smiths and other victims to seek redress for egregious wrongdoing. 
Crookston, 817 P.2d at 806-08 (Utah 1991). The constitutional policy of this 
Court affirms and protects vested property rights; it does not destroy them. 
Bertagnoli v. Baker, 215 P.2d 626, 628 (Utah 1950); Purdy v. Attorney General 
732 A.2d 442, 447 (R.I. 1999). 
While legislative history is entirely silent on the subject, the State Treasurer 
will acknowledge that the new 2004 change in the punitive damage statute, § 78-
18-1(3) (2004), was enacted as an attempt to avoid in the future subjecting the 
punitive damage plaintiff to ordinary income tax liability on 100% of the judgment 
by vesting the State in future punitive damage judgments in Utah. While the 2004 
enactment has no application to 1989 statute, it is a further recognition that under 
§ 78-18-1(3) (1989), the Smiths became constitutionally vested in 100% of the 
punitive damage judgment herein. 
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IV. THE STATE TREASURER ERRONEOUSLY RELIES UPON 
STATUTES OR CASES IN OTHER STATES WHICH ARE EITHER 
INAPPOSITE OR DISTINGUISHED ON THEIR FACE. 
In an attempt to shore up his flawed position, the State Treasurer provides a 
string cite of cases, without analysis, from other states wherein so-called split-
punitive damage recovery statutes were reviewed. State Br. @ pp. 17-18. As 
concluded by the District Court, the weight given to those cases and statutes 
substantially depends on the similarity to the Utah statute § 78-18-1(3) (1989). 
Apart from the Kirk decision, the cases cited are distinguishable, inapposite 
because of statutory dissimilarity, and of no assistance to this Court in deciding the 
constitutional issues in this appeal other than to highlight the divergence. 
The Treasurer first cites Anderson v. State of Alaska, 78 P.3d 710 (Alaska 
2003). In fact, there are two Alaska opinions one, of which the State Treasurer 
cited to the lower court but not on appeal, being Evans v. State of Alaska, 56 P.3d 
1046 (Alaska 2002). R. 5359. In both cases, the four sitting Justices of the Alaska 
Supreme Court were evenly divided, with two Justices opining that the Alaska 
statute was an unconstitutional "taking" and a violation of substantive due process. 
As a result, the district court finding of constitutionality stood. However, two 
Justices writing in Evans focused on the vesting of a property interest in the jury 
verdict stating: 
". . . [I]f the verdict includes no express finding that the state 
deserved part of the money, there is no factual predicate that allows 
the court to . . . divert half the plaintiffs award to the state. 
Regardless of whether we conceptualize a verdict as vesting a 
property interest in the plaintiff or leaving it in the defendant, then, 
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an order awarding half the verdict to the state necessarily results in 
an impermissible taking." 
Evans, 56 P.3d at 1078. In both Evans and Anderson, the two Justices who opined 
that the Alaska statute was constitutional failed to even discuss the constitutionally 
vested property rights that arise in a final judgment or a verdict. 
The Treasurer also cites to DeMendoza v. Huffman, 51 P.3d 1232 (Ore. 
2002). DeMendoza is inapposite for the reason that the Oregon statute, like the 
new 2004 Utah statute, § 78-18-l-(3) (2004), provides that the State of Oregon 
"shall become a judgment creditor as to the punitive damages" and that the 
judgment shall identify the State as a judgment creditor. Id. at 1235; see, O.R.S. § 
18.540. Consequently, unlike § 78-18-1(3) (1989), a final judgment for punitive 
damages in the State of Oregon did not 100% vest in the plaintiff. The Oregon 
Supreme Court, in DeMendoza, emphasized the importance of a final judgment: 
"We note that cases in other jurisdictions agree that a party has no 
vested property right in a claim for punitive damages until judgment 
is entered." 
Id. at 1246 n. 14 (emphasis added). 
In Fust v. Attorney General for the State of Missouri, 947 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. 
1997), also cited, the plaintiff did not raise and the Missouri Court did not address 
a constitutional "takings" challenge under the state or federal Constitutions. The 
plaintiff apparently did raise a Separation of Powers argument, but the Court's 
analysis is superficial and contains no discussion regarding the vested rights in 
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final judgments, completely ignoring the substantial case law developed in the 
path of McCullough v. Virginia, supra at 430-31. 
Cheatham v. Pohle, 789 N.E.2d 467 (Ind. 2003) is equally unavailing to the 
Treasurer. In Cheatham, the Indiana Court ruled, expressly, that the Indiana 
statute was materially different from the Colorado (and thus the Utah) statute in 
Kirk and distinguished Kirk on that basis. Id. at 474-75. The Indiana court failed 
to even raise the question of the constitutionally vested property right in a final 
judgment. Neither did Cheatham discuss the constitutional Separation of Powers 
question. 
The Treasurer further relies upon State of Georgia v. Moseley, et al., 436 
S.E.2d 632 (Ga. 1993). Moseley is only important to demonstrate, like other 
cases, how distinguished it is from this case. In a one-page opinion, the Georgia 
Supreme Court reviewed the Georgia punitive damage statute only in the context 
of a claim by Moseley that the statute denied the punitive damage plaintiff the 
right of trial by jury and "access to the courts." The Georgia court said it did 
neither. 
Moseley is hardly enlightening in this case. The Smiths have not argued 
and do not argue that the common law of Utah regarding punitive damages may 
not be changed without violating the constitutional guarantees of trial by jury and 
open access to the courts. What the Smiths do contend is that if the Legislature is 
to change the law, it must do it in a way and manner that does not result in the 
"taking55 of Smiths5 vested rights in a final judgment, does not diminish, degrade, 
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or abrogate a final judgment of the Judicial Branch, and does not deny the Smiths 
the equal protection of the law. As it was, the Georgia statute, O.C.G.A. § 51-12-
5.1(e)(2) provided that upon issuance of a punitive damage judgment, the State of 
Georgia would have "all rights due a judgment creditor until such judgment is 
satisfied and such judgment shall stand on equal footing with the plaintiff of the 
original case in securing a recovery. . . ." This language appears to have been 
lifted and imported into the language of the new 2004 Utah statute, § 78-18-
l(3)(c). 
Two other cases relied upon by the Treasurer, Gordon v. State of Florida, 
608 So.2d 800, 801-02 (Fla. 1992) and Shepard Components, Inc. v. Brice 
Petrides-Donohue and Assoc, 473 N.W.2d 612, 619 (Iowa 1991), hold, 
unremarkably, that the plaintiff has no vested right to a punitive damage award 
prior to the entry of a judgment. Neither Gordon nor Shepard Components 
involved statutes similar to Utah or Colorado and neither addressed the 
constitutional "taking" and Separation of Powers issues that adhere to a vested 
right in a final judgment that is before this Court. Moreover, the Florida statute in 
Gordon was repealed by the Florida legislature in 1997. Fla. Stat. § 768-73(2)(b). 
New York also repealed its punitive damage statute, the Kansas statute expired, 
and the Colorado statute, C.R.S. § 13-21-102 (4), repealed in 1995, had already 
been declared unconstitutional under the Kirk decision in 1991. 
Thus, the cases and statutes cited by the State Treasurer in his Brief are not 
helpful to his position. Because of the similarity of § 78-18-1(3) (1989) to the 
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Colorado statute struck down in Kirk and that decision's substantial analysis of the 
"takings" issue, the Kirk decision is singularly the most persuasive authority 
before this Court on the constitutional "taking" question. 
V. SECTION 78-18-1(3) (1989), VIOLATES THE SEPARATION OF 
POWERS SET FORTH IN ARTICLES V AND VIII OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION, WHICH PROHIBIT THE LEGISLATURE FROM 
INTERFERING WITH OR IMPAIRING THE INTEGRITY OF A 
FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE JUDICIAL BRANCH. 
The District Court, in holding that § 78-18-1(3) (1989) constituted a 
prohibited "taking" in violation of the Utah and United States Constitutions, did 
not reach Smiths5 further claim that the statute also violates the constitutional 
Separation of Powers Article under the Judicial Article. The conclusion is 
inescapable that § 78-18-1(3) does violate the separation of powers doctrine, 
perhaps the most fundamental principle of the Utah Constitution. 
1. The Separation of Powers Doctrine. 
The Utah Constitution provides for a separation of the three branches of 
government in Article V, Section 1: 
"The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided 
into three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and 
the Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of powers 
properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any 
functions appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases 
herein expressly directed or permitted." 
(Emphasis added). Article V also "prohibits the legislative branch or the executive 
branch from taking over judicial functions." In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 
642 (Utah 1988). The judicial powers of the courts, as set forth in Article VIII, is vested: 
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"in the Senate sitting as a court of impeachment, in a Supreme 
Court, in district courts, in justices of the peace, and such other 
courts inferior to the Supreme Court as may be established by law." 
Art. VIII, sec. 1. The judicial power of the district courts is set forth in Article VIII, 
section 7: 
"The District Court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters civil and 
criminal, not excepted in this Constitution, and not prohibited by law. . . 
The District Courts or any judge thereof, shall have power . . . necessary to 
carry into effect their orders, judgments and decrees . . ." 
The 'judicial power of courts,5 "is generally understood to be the power to hear 
and determine controversies between adverse parties and questions in litigation." 
Timpanogos Planning and Water Management Agency v. Central Utah Water 
Conservancy District 690 P.2d 562, 569 (Utah 1984), quoting Citizens Club v. 
Welling, 27 P.2d, 23 (1933). 
Utah courts have long recognized the danger of legislative intrusion into 
judicial functions. In the early case In re Handley's Estate, 49 P. 829 (Utah 1897), 
this Court addressed the separation of powers in reviewing a statute affecting final 
judgments. The Court explained the purpose behind the separation of powers 
doctrine: 
"The purpose of separating and classifying the powers of 
government, and of intrusting the lawmaking power to the officers of 
one department and the right to execute laws to another, and the 
power to interpret and construe and apply laws to the conduct and 
contentions of mankind to another, was to prevent the evils that 
would arise if all were concentrated and held by the same hand. 
Such a concentration of power would give to the class of officers 
possessing it absolute power and that would amount to a despotism." 
Id. at 830. The law at issue in Handley's Estate allowed heirs to reopen final 
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probate judgments. The Court held that the law constituted a legislative 
usurpation of judicial authority and thus violated the separation of powers: 
"If we were to affirm the validity of the law in question, we would, 
in effect, say that the legislature may exercise judicial powers, 
authorize and require the courts to set aside final judgments and 
decrees, divest titles, and destroy and annihilate vested rights. The 
people of the state have not intrusted such powers to the legislature." 
Id. at 831 (emphasis added). 
This Court has more recently rejected, under the Separation of Powers 
doctrine, attempts by the legislature to wield judicial power. See ej*. Salt Lake 
City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 852 (Utah 1994) (holding unconstitutional a statute 
by which the legislature attempted to vest judicial power in persons not duly 
appointed as Article VIII judges). "Core judicial functions necessarily include all 
powers that are 'necessary to protect the fundamental integrity of the judicial 
branch5 and, as such, may not be delegated to persons other than judicial officers." 
Id. at 849 (citations omitted). Such knowledgeable core judicial functions include 
"the authority to enforce any valid judgment, decree or order." Id. 
2. The Controlling Precedent of the Constitutional 
Separation of Powers Doctrine Precludes the State 
Treasurer's Appeal. 
The Separation of Powers doctrine in the Utah Constitution is modeled 
upon Articles I, II, and III of the Constitution of the United States. fl[T]he central 
judgment of the Framers of the Constitution [was] that, within our political 
scheme, the separation of governmental powers into three coordinate Branches is 
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essential to the preservation of liberty." Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 
380(1989).4 
The Supreme Court of the United States first addressed the relationship 
between the judiciary and the legislature in Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 
(1792). At issue was a federal statute providing that the courts would determine 
whether a war veteran was entitled to a pension and the amount thereof, and that 
the Secretary of War was to review the court decision and transmit his opinion to 
Congress for its approval. Although the case was dismissed as moot, the Justices' 
views regarding the constitutionality of the statute were noted. The Justices and 
judges of three circuit courts refused to entertain the applications under the 
statutory scheme, the New York panel stating: 
"[The Act] subjects the decisions of these courts . . . first to the 
consideration and suspension of the secretary of war, and then to the 
revision of the legislature; whereas, by the constitution, neither the 
secretary of war, nor any other executive officer, nor even the 
legislature, are authorized to sit as a court of errors on the judicial 
acts or opinions of this court." 
Id. at 412. The justices from Pennsylvania jointly mailed a letter to President 
Washington declaring that "[n]o decision of any court of the United States can, 
4
 Where provisions of the Utah State Constitution and the United States 
Constitution are similar, this Court looks to federal case law for guidance in 
interpreting the state constitutional provision. Rg. West Gallery Corporation v. 
Salt Lake City Board of Commissioners, 586 P.2d 429 (Utah 1978) (federal case 
law concerning free speech guarantees relied on in interpreting state constitutional 
provision); Terra Utilities, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 575 P.2d 1029, 1033 
(Utah 1978) (due process decisions of the U.S. Constitution "are highly persuasive 
as to the application of that [due process] clause of our state Constitution"). 
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under any circumstances . . . be liable to a revision, or even suspension, by the 
legislature itself, in whom no judicial power of any kind appears to be vested." Id. 
The fundamental and founding principle that decisions of the judiciary 
cannot be revised or altered by the legislature has been restated aad affirmed on 
numerous occasions. See McCullough, 172 U.S. at 123-24; Johnston. 14 F.3d at 
490-91. The United States Supreme Court recently reiterated this crucial rule in 
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm. Inc.. 514 U.S. 211 (1995): 
"The record of history shows that the Framers crafted this charter of 
the judicial department with an expressed understanding that it gives 
the Federal Judiciary the power, not merely to rule on cases, but to 
decide them, subject to review only by superior courts in the Article 
III hierarchy—with an understanding, in short, that 'a judgment 
conclusively resolves the case' because 'a "judicial Power" is one to 
render dispositive judgments.5" 
Id. at 218-19 (emphasis added), citing Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 Case 
W. Res. L. Rev. 905, 926 (1990). 
Under the Separation of Powers doctrine, the legislature is prohibited from 
interfering in or revising the final judgment of a court of this State: 
"In cases involving the Congress and the federal judiciary, the vested 
rights doctrine . . . has a separation of powers component which 
prevents Congress from sitting as a 'court of errors' with the power 
to suspend or revise final judgments of the federal courts." 
Johnston, 14 F.3d at 491 (emphasis added). "It is not within the power of the 
legislature to take away rights which have been once vested by a judgment." 
McCullough, 172 U.S. at 123-24; see also Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont 
Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 431 (1855). 
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In addition to Hayburn's Case, the United States Supreme Court in United 
States v. O'Grady, 89 U.S. 641 (1874) soundly rejected the United States5 attempt 
to revise the terms a final judgment by way of legislation in existence at the time 
of the judgment. Therein, the United States, in paying on a final judgment owed 
to plaintiff, attempted to deduct from the judgment a tax allegedly owed by the 
plaintiff to the United States. The Supreme Court found that the United States 
failed to raise a counterclaim for the tax and had no legal basis to alter the final 
judgment: 
"Judicial jurisdiction implies the power to hear and determine a 
cause, and inasmuch as the [United States] Constitution does not 
contemplate that there shall be more than one Supreme Court, it is 
quite clear that Congress cannot subject the judgments of the 
Supreme Court to the reexamination and revision of any other 
tribunal or any other department of government." 
Id. at 647-48. 
3. The State Treasurer Misapprehends the Nature and Magnitude 
of the Separation of Powers Doctrine. 
The Treasurer claims that § 78-18-1(3) does not violate the constitutional 
separation of powers because "[ojnce the punitive damages were defined by 
statute, that is the sum that the Smiths or others similarly situated could expect to 
recover under any judgment where punitive damages are awarded." State Br. @ 
17. There are fatal defects in the Treasurer's argument. First, the District Court's 
June 29, 2001 judgment plainly and articulately states that the Smiths, and only 
the Smiths, have a vested interest in the compensatory and punitive damage 
judgment. Second is the equally obvious problem that the Treasurer is not named 
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anywhere in the Judgment even as an interested party, much less a judgment 
creditor. Third, the Smiths were aware of the statute as well as the likelihood of 
its unconstitutionality. The Treasurer never intervened to claim a vested interest. 
As a result, the final judgment constitutionally vested in the Smiths on June 29, 
2001, which judgment was thereafter reviewed and affirmed by this Court. The 
final judgment is now unequivocally beyond rewrite or revision that would alter its 
plain terms or attempt to divest, dilute, or deprive the Smiths of their constitutional 
rights and property interests. 
The fact that the statute existed at the time of the judgment is irrelevant 
because, as earlier stated, it does not vest in the Treasurer any interest in the final 
judgment but only conditionally or hypothetically upon payment of the punitive 
award by the judgment debtor to the judgment plaintiff. 
If the State Treasurer is successful in his argument herein, then no final 
judgment of this Court will be secure from legislative invasion and revision. The 
law set forth in Hayburn's Case, O'Grady, and two-hundred and fifty years of 
Separation of Powers jurisprudence plainly forecloses that possibility. 
VI. THE STATUTE, § 78-18-1(3) (1989), VIOLATES THE SMITHS' 
RIGHTS TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW ESTABLISHED BY 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 24 OF THE UTAH 
STATE CONSTITUTION. 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that 
all persons "similarly situated" will be treated similarly. City of Cleburne, Tex, v. 
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Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). The Utah Constitution 
provides at Article 1, Sec. 24: 
"All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." 
Although the language of the Utah Clause is different from the Fourteenth 
Amendment, "these provisions embody the same general principle: persons 
similarly situated should be treated similarly, and persons in different 
circumstances should not be treated as if their circumstances were the same." 
Malan v. Lewis. 693 P.2d 661, 669 (Utah 1984). 
In point of law, Utah courts may construe the Equal Protection Clause in 
the Utah Constitution even more broadly than its Federal counterpart: 
"Although Article I, § 24 of the Utah Constitution 
incorporates the same general fundamental principles as are 
incorporated in the Equal Protection Clause, our construction and 
application of Article I, § 24 are not controlled by the federal courts' 
construction and application of the Equal Protection Clause. Case 
law developed under the Fourteenth Amendment may be persuasive 
in applying Article I, § 24, but that law is not binding so long as we 
do not reach a result that violates the Equal Protection Clause." 
Id. at 670 (case citations omitted). 
Under Article I, Section 24 of the Constitution: "a two-part test is necessary 
to ensure the uniform operation of the laws: 'first, a law must apply equally to all 
persons within a class. Second, the statutory classifications and the different 
treatment given the classes must be based on differences that have a reasonable 
tendency to further the objectives of the statute." Condemarin v. University 
Hospital 775 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1989), quoting Malan v. Lewis. 
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Section 78-18-1(3) (1989) violates the Equal Protection guarantees of both 
the Federal and State Constitutions. First, the statute discriminates between 
similarly situated persons by taking 50% of punitive damage awards but leaving 
untouched statutory punitive damage awards. Second, the statute discriminates 
against similarly situated persons by taking 50% of punitive damage awards but 
not taking punitive damages obtained by settlement. 
1. Section 78-18-1(3) (1989) Does Not Touch Statutory Punitive 
Damages That are Punitive in Nature. 
The statute fails to pass muster under the Equal Protection Clauses as it 
does not apply to plaintiffs who recover statutory punitive damage awards of 
double or treble damages, even though such punitive awards are equally intended 
as punishment for improper behavior. See, e.g., Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 
F.2d 873, 888 (8th Cir. 1979), cert, denied, 446 U.S. 918 (1980). For instance: 
• The Utah Antitrust Act provides for an award of "three times the amount of 
damages sustained." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-919(l)(b). 
• The Utah Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act (formerly the RICE statute), 
provides for an award of "twice the damages" sustained. Utah Code Ann. § 
76-10-1605(1). 
• The issuer of a bad check may be liable for triple the check amount. Utah 
Code Ann. § 7-15-l(7)(b)(vi)(A)(II). 
• Treble damages are awarded in successful forcible entry and detainer cases. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(3). 
• In an action for waste, "there may be a judgment for treble damages." Utah 
Code Ann. §78-38-2. 
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Numerous such examples exist under Federal statutes as well. For instance, The 
Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a), the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 
1203(c)(4), the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), and RICO, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a), 
each provide for treble damages. 
A simple example demonstrates that Section 78-18-1(3) violates the 
Smiths' guarantees to Equal Protection. Plaintiff brings a lawsuit against 
defendant for price fixing under the Utah antitrust laws, for breach of fiduciary 
duty and for common law fraud. The jury finds liability on all three counts and 
awards $1 million compensatory damages, and also awards punitive damages of 
$3 million for the breach of fiduciary duty and common law fraud counts. By 
statute, plaintiff would also receive $3 million treble exemplary damages under the 
Antitrust Statute. Under the Treasurer's theory of this case, would he claim 
entitlement to 50% of the $3 million treble damages award for the antitrust 
violation under § 78-18-1(3) (1989) as he would claim 50% of the punitive 
damages award on the breach of fiduciary duty and fraud counts, when paid? The 
Treasurer has stated that § 78-18-1(3) (1989) was not intended to reach statutory 
punitive damages. R. 5362. That being the case, the Equal Protection violation is 
clear. There is no rational basis for the Utah Legislature's attempt to take 50% of 
punitive damages under § 78-18-1(3) (1989) but not 50% of other punitive 
damages awarded under punitive statutes. 
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2. The Statute S 78-18-1(3) (1989) Does Not Reach Punitive Damages 
Obtained by Settlement 
The statute applies by its terms to punitive damages which are "awarded 
and paid." Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-l(3)(l) (1989) (emphasis added). Its 
operation thus applies to litigants who obtain punitive damages by trial but not to 
litigants who receive payment of punitive damages claim by settlement. The 
distinction is without rationale. 
If litigants who succeed in recovering punitive damage payments are to be 
penalized by the State taking one-half, there is no rational basis for distinguishing 
between the methods by which such damages are obtained and paid. The effect 
punishes litigants who properly invoke their rights to the open courts of Utah and 
prevail against a defendant who has acted willfully, maliciously, or with wanton 
disregard of the rights of plaintiff. 
VII. IN THE ALTERNATIVE ONLY, IF THIS COURT UPHOLDS THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF § 78-18-1(3) (1989), THE SMITHS ARE 
NONETHELESS ENTITLED TO ALL INTEREST ON THE 
PUNITIVE DAMGE JUDGMENT WHICH VESTED ON JUNE 29, 
2001. 
If this Court affirms the District Court, it will be unnecessary to address 
this question. However, were this Court to reverse and uphold § 78-18-1(3) 
(1989), interest on the punitive judgment which accrued from the date of judgment 
through the date of payment is vested in and owed to the Smiths. 
Price Development was required to pay statutory interest on the entire 
punitive damage judgment from the date of its entry on June 29, 2001 to the date 
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of payment. Even if § 78-18-1(3) (1989) were assumed to be constitutional, the 
best argument which the State Treasurer could make in that event would be an 
entitlement to a net 50% of the punitive damage award, but not until and only if 
the "award" is paid. In other words, the Treasurer's entitlement starts to run only 
when there is a payment of the award by Price Development to the Smiths, not 
when the judgment was entered. It is only the Smiths who are vested in the 
punitive damage judgment and it is only that judgment, not the punitive damage 
award, which carries statutory interest. Assuming, arguendo, § 78-18-1(3) (1989) 
is constitutional, the Legislature did not specify that the Treasurer would be 
entitled to statutory interest on the punitive damage award. It could have and has 
done so when that was the legislative intent. E.g. Utah Eminent Domain Code, § 
78-34-9(5)(c) (the judgment "shall include, as part of the just compensation 
awarded, interest at the rate of 8% per annum . . .") . 
Interest payable on the judgment under Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4(2) is 
vested in and payable only to the Smiths, regardless of the Treasurer's claim of 
entitlement to a net 50% of the punitive damage award when it was triggered by 
payment three years later. The failure of the Treasurer to be vested in the 
judgment deprives him, as a matter of law, of the $560,020 interest accrued on the 
judgment while the Smiths were enforcing and defending the same against Price 
Development. 
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C O N C L U S I O N 
For the reasons stated herein, this Court should affirm the decision of the 
District Court that § 78-18-1(3) (1989) violates the "takings55 prohibitions in the 
Utah and United States Constitutions. The statute further violates the Separation 
of Powers established in the Utah Constitution, and Equal Protection guarantees of 
the State and Federal Charters. In the alternative only, if the statute is upheld to be 
constitutional, the Smiths are entitled to the full amount of interest on the June 29, 
2001 judgment 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL 
JENNIFER A. WHITLOCK 
VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
50 S. Main Street, 16th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellees. 
December 14, 2004. 
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78-18-1. Basis for punitive damages awards — Section 
inapplicable to DUI cases — Division of award 
with state. 
(1) (a) Except as otherwise provided by statute, punitive damages may be 
awarded only if compensatory or general damages are awarded and it is 
established by clear and convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of 
the tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or intentionally 
fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless 
indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others. 
(b) The limitations, standards of evidence, and standards of conduct of 
Subsection (l)(a) do not apply to any claim for punitive damages arising 
out of the tortfeasor's operation of a motor vehicle while voluntarily 
intoxicated or under the influence of any drug or combination of alcohol 
and drugs as prohibited by Section 41-6-44. 
(c) The award of a penalty under Section 78-11-15 or 78-11-16 regarding 
shoplifting is not subject to the prior award of compensatory or general 
damages under Subsection (l)(a) whether or not restitution has been paid 
to the merchant prior to or as a part of a civil action under Section 78-11-15 
or 78-11-16. 
(2) Evidence of a party's wealth or financial condition shall be admissible 
only after a finding of liability for punitive damages has been made. 
(3) In any judgment where punitive damages are awarded and paid, 50% of 
the amount of the punitive damages in excess of $20,000 shall, after payment 
of attorneys' fees and costs, be remitted to the state treasurer for deposit into 
the General Fund. 
History: C. 1953, 78-18-1, enacted by L. Applicability. — Laws 1989, ch. 237, § 4 
1989, ch. 237, § 1; 1991, ch. 6, § 4. provides that the act applies to all claims for 
punitive damages that arise on or after May 1, 
1989. 
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Tab 2 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE I 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
Sec. 22. [Private property for public use.] 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public 
use without just compensation. 1896 
Tab 3 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Amendment V - Trial and Punishment, Compensation for Takings. Ratified 12/15/1791. 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or 
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
Tab 4 
CHAPTER 18 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS 
78-18-1. Basis for punitive damages awards — Section 
inapplicable to DUI cases — Division of 
award with state. 
(1) (a) Except as otherwise provided by statute, punitive 
damages may be awarded only if compensatory or general 
damages are awarded and it is established by clear and 
convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of the 
tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or inten-
tionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a 
knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disre-
gard of, the rights of others. 
(b) The limitations, standards of evidence, and stan-
dards of conduct of Subsection (l)(a) do not apply to any 
claim for punitive damages arising out of the tortfeasor's 
operation of a motor vehicle or motorboat while voluntar-
ily intoxicated or under the influence of any drug or 
combination of alcohol and drugs as prohibited by Section 
41-6-44. 
(c) The award of a penalty under Section 78-11-15 or 
78-11-16 regarding shoplifting is not subject to the prior 
award of compensatory or general damages under Sub-
section (l)(a) whether or not restitution has been paid to 
the merchant prior to or as a part of a civil action under 
Section 78-11-15 or 78-11-16. 
(2) Evidence of a party's wealth or financial condition shall 
be admissible only after a finding of liability for punitive 
damages has been made. 
(3) (a) In any case where punitive damages are awarded, 
the judgment shall provide that 50% of the amount of the 
punitive damages in excess of $20,000 shall, after an 
allowable deduction for the payment of attorneys' fees and 
costs, be remitted by the judgment debtor to the state 
treasurer for deposit into the General Fund. 
(b) For the purposes of this Subsection (3), an "allow-
able deduction for the payment of attorneys' fees and 
costs" shall equal the amount of actual and reasonable 
attorneys' fees and costs incurred by the judgment credi-
tor minus the amount of any separate judgment awarding 
attorneys' fees and costs to the judgment creditor. 
(c) The state shall have all rights due a judgment 
creditor until the judgment is satisfied, and stand on 
equal footing with the judgment creditor of the original 
case in securing a recovery. 
(d) Unless all affected parties, including the state, 
expressly agree otherwise or the application is contrary to 
the terms of the judgment, any payment on the judgment 
by or on behalf of any judgment debtor, whether voluntary 
or by execution or otherwise, shall be applied in the 
following order: 
(i) compensatory damages, and any applicable at-
torneys fees and costs; 
(ii) the initial $20,000 punitive damages; and fi-
nally 
(iii) the balance of the punitive dam a crpa — 
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PUNITIVE DAMAGES AMENDMENTS 
2004 GENERAL SESSION 
STATE OF UTAH 
Sponsor: Lyle W. Hillyard 
LONG TITLE 
General Description: 
This bill makes changes concerning the division of punitive damage awards with the 
state. 
Highlighted Provisions: 
This bill: 
• requires that the state's portion of a punitive damage award be paid directly to the 
state by the judgment debtor; 
• puts the state on the same footing as another judgment creditor when collecting 
punitive damages; and 
• prescribes a priority and order for the payment of punitive damages. 
Monies Appropriated in this Bill: 
None 
Other Special Clauses: 
None 
Utah Code Sections Affected: 
AMENDS: 
78-18-1, as last amended by Chapters 200 and 314, Laws of Utah 2002 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
Section 1. Section 78-18-1 is amended to read: 
78-18-1. Basis for punitive damages awards - Section inapplicable to DUI cases 
— Division of award with state. 
(1) (a) Except as otherwise provided by statute, punitive damages may be awarded only 
S.B. 201 Enrolled Copy 
if compensatory or general damages are awarded and it is established by clear and convincing 
evidence that the acts or omissions of the tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or 
intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference 
toward, and a disregard of, the rights of others. 
(b) The limitations, standards of evidence, and standards of conduct of Subsection (l)(a) 
do not apply to any claim for punitive damages arising out of the tortfeasor's operation of a motor 
vehicle or motorboat while voluntarily intoxicated or under the influence of any drug or 
combination of alcohol and drugs as prohibited by Section 41-6-44. 
(c) The award of a penalty under Section 78-11-15 or 78-11-16 regarding shoplifting is 
not subject to the prior award of compensatory or general damages under Subsection (l)(a) 
whether or not restitution has been paid to the merchant prior to or as a part of a civil action 
under Section 78-11-15 or 78-11-16. 
(2) Evidence of a party's wealth or financial condition shall be admissible only after a 
finding of liability for punitive damages has been made. 
(3) (a) In any [judgment] case where punitive damages are awarded [and paid], the 
judgment shall provide that 50% of the amount of the punitive damages in excess of $20,000 
shall, after an allowable deduction for the payment of attorneys' fees and costs, be remitted by the 
judgment debtor to the statetreasurer for deposit into the General Fund. 
(b) For the purposes of this Subsection (3), an "allowable deduction for the payment of 
attorneys' fees and costs" shall equal the amount of actual and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs 
incurred by the judgment creditor[;] minus the amount of any separate judgment awarding 
attorneys' fees and costs to the judgment creditor. 
(c) The state shall have all rights due a judgment creditor until the judgment is satisfied, 
and stand on equal footing with the judgment creditor of the original case in securing a recovery. 
(d) Unless all affected parties, including the state, expressly agree otherwise or the 
application is contrary to the terms of the judgment, any payment on the judgment by or on behalf 
of any judgment debtor, whether voluntary or by execution or otherwise, shall be applied in the 
following order: 
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(i) compensatory damages, and any applicable attorneys fees and costs; 
(ii) the initial $20,000 punitive damages; and finally 
fiii) the balance of the punitive damages. 
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Tab 5 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE V 
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS 
Section 1. [Three departments of government] 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be 
divided into three distinct departments, the Legislative, the 
Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with the 
exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these depart-
ments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of 
the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or 
permitted. 1896 
Tab 6 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE I 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
Tab 7 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE VIII 
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT 
Section 1. [Judicial powers — Courts.] 
The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme 
court, in a trial court of general jurisdiction known as the 
district court, and in such other courts as the Legislature by 
statute may establish. The Supreme Court, the district court, 
and such other courts designated by statute shall be courts of 
record. Courts not of record shall also be established by 
Statute . 1984 (2nd S.S.) 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE VIII 
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT 
Sec. 7. [Qualifications of justices and judges.] 
Supreme Court justices shall be at least 30 years old, United 
States citizens, Utah residents for five years preceding selec-
tion, and admitted to practice law in Utah. Judges of other 
courts of record shall be at least 25 years old, United States 
citizens, Utah residents for three years preceding selection, 
and admitted to practice law in Utah. If geographic divisions 
are provided for any court, judges of that court shall reside in 
the geographic division for which they are selected. 
1984 (2nd S.S.) 
Tab 8 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Amendment XIV - Citizenship rights. Ratified 7/9/1868. 
1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any 
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, 
counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to 
vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the 
Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, 
and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such 
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice-
President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having 
previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member 
of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of 
the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or 
comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for 
payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be 
questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation 
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or 
emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. 
Tab 9 
262 Colo. 818 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
was that the additional wells issue was 
common to several actions, including the 
yet uncompleted actions.13 This common 
issue makes consolidated appellate review 
especially suitable. Interim appellate re-
view creates the possibility of duplicative 
appellate review of this issue. Moreover, 
we see no urgent reason for immediate, 
separate appellate review. The presump-
tion of nonappealability has not been over-
come. Under these facts, we are per-
suaded that the judgments appealed from 
cannot be considered final in absence of a 
Rule 54(b) certification. We therefore dis-
miss the appeals for lack of appellate juris-
diction. 
Appeals dismissed. 
Dewayne C. KIRK, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
The DENVER PUBLISHING COM-
PANY, a Colorado corporation, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
No. 88SA405. 
Supreme Court of Colorado, 
En Banc. 
Sept. 23, 1991. 
Newspaper publisher sued its distribu-
tor for balance allegedly owed. Distribu-
tor counterclaimed for outrageous conduct 
and willful and wanton breach of contract. 
The District Court, City and County of 
Denver, Robert T. Kingsley, J., granted 
distributor's motion for directed verdict on 
publisher's claim for monies due on open 
account, directed verdict against distributor 
on his counterclaim for outrageous conduct 
and entered judgment for distributor on his 
claim for willful and wanton breach of con-
tract. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, 
729 P.2d 1004, remanded for new trial on 
13. See supra note 6. 
damages, but otherwise affirmed. On re-
mand, the District Court, John W Cough-
lin, J., awarded exemplary damages, but 
denied distributor's motion challenging con-
stitutionality of statutory requirement that 
he pay one third of all such damages into 
state general fund. Distributor appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Quinn, J., held that 
statute requiring party receiving exempla-
ry damages award to pay one third of such 
award into state general fund effected an 
unconstitutional taking of private property 
without just compensation. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Rovira, C.J., filed dissenting opinion in 
which Lohr, J., joined. 
1. Constitutional Law <s=>277(l) 
Judgment for exemplary damages qua-
lifies as property interest subject to consti-
tutional protection. West's C.R.S.A. 
§§ 13-21-102(4), 13-52-102(1); U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmends. 5, 14; West's C.R.S.A. 
Const. Art. 2, § 15. 
2. Constitutional Law <3=>278(1) 
Private property interest emanating di-
rectly from final judgment cannot be dimin-
ished by legislative fiat. U.S.C.A. Const. 
Amends. 5, 14; West's C.R.S.A. Const. Art. 
2. § 15. 
3. Eminent Domain <e=>2(l.l) 
To withstand constitutional challenge 
to governmental appropriation of signifi-
cant part of money judgment under taking 
clause of United States Constitution, gov-
ernmental appropriation must bear reason-
able relationship to governmental services 
provided to civil litigants in making use of 
judicial process for purpose of resolving 
civil claim resulting in the judgment. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 5. 
4. Eminent Domain <§=>2(1.1) 
Statute requiring party receiving ex-
emplary damages award to pay one third of 
such award into state general fund effect-
ed an unconstitutional taking of private 
property without just compensation. 
West's C.R.S.A. § 13-21-102(4); U.S.C.A. 
KIRK v. DENVER PUB. CO. 
Cite as 818 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991) 
Colo. 263 
ConstAmends. 5, 14; 
Const. Art 2, § 15, 
West's C.R.S.A. 
5. Damages <s=»87(l) 
Statute requiring party receiving ex-
emplary damages award to pay one third of 
such award into state general fund did not 
qualify as valid penalty or forfeiture; plac-
ing burden of payment on judgment credi-
tor who suffered wrong bore no reasonable 
relationship to any arguable goal of punish-
ing wrongdoer or deterring others from 
engaging in similar conduct. West's 
C.R.S.A. § 13-21-102(4). 
6. Taxation <s=»73 
Statute requiring party receiving ex-
emplary damages award to pay one third 
into state general fund did not satisfy crite-
ria for ad valorem property tax; statute 
was designed to raise revenues for state 
general fund, but was limited only to per-
sonal property in form of judgment for 
exemplary damages and had no applicabili-
ty at all to any other form of private prop-
erty, real or personal. West's C.R.S.A. 
§ 13-21-102(4). 
7. Taxation <s=*40(l) 
Where obvious purpose of statute is to 
produce revenue for state general fund, 
statute must conform to state constitution-
al requirement that all taxes upon each of 
the various classes of real and personal 
property be "uniform" and be levied under 
general laws prescribing such regulations 
as shall secure just and equal valuations of 
all property, whether real or personal. 
West's C.R.S.A. Const. Art. 10, § 3; West's 
C.R.S.A. § 13-21-102(4). 
8. Constitutional Law <s=*229(l) 
Damages @=>87(1) 
Taxation <3=>40(6) 
Statute requiring party receiving ex-
emplary damages award to pay one third 
into state general fund did not qualify as 
valid excise tax; excise tax imposed on 
limited class of persons exercising their 
rights to use courts, while other persons 
exercising same right were not subject to 
tax, would be so underinclusive as not to 
withstand even rational-basis standard of 
review under equal protection analysis. 
West's C.R.S.A. § 13-21-102(4); U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 14. 
9. Licenses G=>29 
Valid user fee need not be designed 
with mathematical precision to defray cost 
of service for which fee is imposed, but 
must bear reasonable relationship to over-
all cost of that service. 
10. Damages <s=*87(l) 
Statute requiring party receiving ex-
emplary damages award to pay one third of 
such award into state general fund failed 
to qualify as valid user fee; statute exact-
ed a forced contribution in order to provide 
general governmental revenues and did so 
in a manner and to a degree not reasonably 
related to costs of using the courts. 
West's C.R.S.A. § 13-21-102(4). 
11. Constitutional Law ®=>55 
Legislature may well abate or diminish 
pending civil action, but when that claim 
ripens into judgment, power of legislature 
to disturb the rights created thereby ceas-
es. 
Pryor, Carney and Johnson, P.C., W. 
Randolph Barnhart, Arlene V. Dykstra, 
Thomas L. Roberts, Richard V. Hess, En-
glewood, for plaintiff-appellant. 
Gale A. Norton, Atty. Gen., Raymond T. 
Slaughter, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Timo-
thy M. Tymkovich, Sol. Gen., Dianne Eret, 
First Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for amicus 
curiae State of Colo. 
Justice QUINN delivered the Opinion of 
the Court. 
This case involves a challenge to the 
constitutionality of section 13-21-102(4), 
6A C.R.S. (1987), which was enacted in 
1986 as part of tort-reform legislation and 
requires a party receiving an exemplary 
damages award to pay one-third of all such 
"damages collected . . . into the state gen-
eral fund." l DeWayne C. Kirk filed a tort 
claim against Denver Publishing Company, 
1. Appellate jurisdiction over this appeal lies in ute is challenged, 
this court because the constitutionality of a stat- (1987). 
§ 13-4-102(l)(b), 6A C.R.S. 
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doing business as The Rocky Mountain Company's claim for monies due on open 
News, and was awarded a judgment for account, directed a verdict against Kirk on 
exemplary damages in the amount of $118,- his counterclaim for outrageous conduct, 
980. In a post-trial motion Kirk unsuccess- and entered a judgment of $910.26 for Kirk 
fully challenged the constitutionality of the on the jury's verdict returned in his favor 
one-third payment requirement and there- on his claim for willful and wanton breach 
after filed this appeal. We conclude that of contract. The court of appeals affirmed 
section 13-21-102(4) effectuates a forced the trial court's directed verdicts on Denver 
taking of the judgment creditor's property Publishing Company's open account claim 
interest in the judgment and does so in a and Kirk's counterclaim for outrageous 
manner and to a degree unrelated to any conduct, and also affirmed the judgment of 
constitutionally permissible governmental liability on Kirk's counterclaim against 
interest served by the taking and, there- Denver Publishing Company for willful and 
fore, violates the federal and state constitu- wanton breach of contract, but remanded 
tional proscriptions against the taking of the case for a new trial "on the issues of 
private property without just compensa- actual damages, damages for emotional dis-
tion. U.S. Const, amends. V & XIV; Colo, tress, and exemplary damages" on Kirk's 
Const, art. II, § 15. We accordingly re- contractual claim. Denver Publishing Co. 
verse that part of the judgment upholding v. Kirk, 729 P.2d 1004, 1009 (Colo.App. 
the constitutionality of section 13-21- 1986). 
102(4), and we remand the case to the dis-
 U p o n r e m a n d o f t h e c a s e f o r a n e w tr ial> 
trict court with directions to conform its Kirk was realigned as the plaintiff and was 
judgment to the views herein expressed, permitted to add a claim for malicious pros-
ecution. The case was retried in 1988, and 
the jury awarded Kirk compensatory dam-
Although this case has a lengthy proce- ages in the aggregate amount of $288,000 
dural history, the basic facts can be briefly and exemplary damages in the amount of 
stated. Kirk, who owned and operated an $160,500 on Kirk's claim for malicious pros-
independent newspaper distributorship, ecution. The exemplary damages award, 
purchased newspapers from The Rocky at the request of Kirk, was subsequently 
Mountain News and resold them to news- reduced to $118,980 so as not to exceed the 
paper carriers, stores, and to the public amount of actual damages on Kirk's claim 
through newspaper racks. In November for malicious prosecution.2 After the jury 
1979, Kirk terminated his relationship with verdict, Kirk filed a post-trial motion in 
Denver Publishing Company, but withheld which he requested the district court to 
payment for part of his September and all invalidate, as violative of several provisions 
of his October billings in order to achieve of both the United States and Colorado 
leverage in his final accounting with Den- Constitutions, the statutory requirement of 
ver Publishing Company. section 13-21-102(4) that he pay one-third 
Because Kirk and the company were un- o f a n y collected exemplary damages award 
able to settle a final accounting, Denver t o t h e s t a t e general fund. The district 
Publishing Company sued Kirk for the bal- c o u r t d e n i e d t h e motion, 
ance allegedly owed by him. Kirk counter- Kirk thereafter filed this appeal and in-
claimed for outrageous conduct and willful vokes several federal and state constitu-
and wanton breach of contract. In the tional provisions in challenging the one-
first trial, the court granted Kirk's motion third payment requirement of section 13-
for a directed verdict on Denver Publishing 21-102(4). Denver Publishing Company 
2. The statutory scheme for exemplary damages 
provides that an exemplary damages award 
must not exceed the amount of actual damages 
unless exceptional circumstances not present 
here justify an increase. §§ 13-21-102(l)(a) & 
13-21-102(3), 6A C.R.S. (1987). Kirk and Den-
ver Publishing Company stipulated that the ma-
licious prosecution claim, on which the exem-
plary damages award was based, arose subse-
quent to the effective date of the 1986 statutory 
scheme. 
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takes no position on the constitutionality of ture, Seaward 
the statute. The Attorney General, how-
ever, has intervened as amicus and has 
filed a brief in support of the district 
court's declaration of constitutionality. We 
find it unnecessary to address all of Kirk's 
claims, as we conclude that the mandatory 
one-third payment requirement of section 
13-21-102(4) violates the Taking Clause of 
the United States and Colorado Constitu-
tions.3 Our conclusion derives from the 
nature of an exemplary damages award as 
a private property right, the confiscatory 
character of the "taking" mandated by the 
statute, and the manifest absence of a rea-
sonable nexus between the statutory tak-
ing of one-third of the exemplary damages 
award and the cost of any governmental 
services that arguably might support a sig-
nificantly smaller forced contribution. 
Colo. 265 
II. 
We begin our analysis by examining the 
nature of an award for exemplary dam-
ages. 
Tort law generally provides for two 
types of monetary remedies for a civil 
wrong. Compensatory damages are in-
tended to "make [the plaintiff] whole," 
Bullerdick v. Pritchard, 90 Colo. 272, 275, 
8 P.2d 705, 706 (1932), while exemplary 
damages are intended to punish the wrong-
doer and deter similar conduct in the fu-
3. Kirk raises the following constitutional claims 
which we find it unnecessary to address: that 
section 13-21-102(4) violates procedural and 
substantive due process of law and equal protec-
tion of the laws guaranteed by the United States 
and Colorado Constitutions, U.S. Const, amend. 
XIV; Colo. Const, art. II, § 25; that the statute 
was enacted in contravention of the General 
Assembly's revenue-raising authority conferred 
by article X of the Colorado Constitution; that 
the statute impairs the obligation of Kirk's con-
tingency-fee contract with his attorney in viola-
tion of the constitutional proscription against 
the impairment of contracts under the United 
States and Colorado Constitutions, U.S. Const, 
art. I, § 10; Colo. Const, art. II, § 11; and that 
the statutory taking authorized by section 13-
21-102(4) contravenes the separation-of-powers 
doctrine set forth in article III of the Colorado 
Constitution. 
Construction Co., Inc. v. 
Bradley, 817 P.2d 971, 974 (Colo.1991), 
Leidholt v. District Court, 619 P.2d 768, 
770 (Colo. 1980); Mince v. Butters, 200 
Colo. 501, 503, 616 P.2d 127, 129 (1980). 
This is not to say that these two remedies 
are totally unrelated to and independent of 
each other. We implicitly recognized the 
interrelationship between compensatory 
and exemplary damages in Palmer v. A.E 
Robins Co., Inc., 684 P.2d 187, 213-14 
(Colo. 1984), where we observed that a claim 
for exemplary damages is not "a separate 
and distinct cause of action," but rather "is 
auxiliary to an underlying claim for actual 
damages" and thus can be entered only in 
conjunction with an underlying and suc-
cessful claim for actual damages assessed 
against a wrongdoer for a legal wrong to 
the injured party. So also, a claim for 
exemplary damages contemplates "tortious 
conduct," Mortgage Finance, Inc. v. Podle-
ski, 742 P.2d 900, 902 (Colo.1987), and in 
that respect, requires, as does a claim for 
compensatory damages, some measure of 
legal fault. See Harding Glass Co., Inc. v. 
Jones, 640 P.2d 1123, 1126-27 (Colo.1982). 
Thus, while a compensatory damages 
award serves the reparative function of 
making the injured party whole, it also 
performs the secondary function of dis-
couraging "a repetition of [the defendant's] 
wrongful conduct" by serving as a "warn-
ing to others who are inclined to commit 
similar wrongs." C. Morris, Punitive 
Damages in Tort Cases, 44 Harv.L.Rev. 
1173, 1174 (1931).4 In a somewhat similar 
4. This interrelationship between the reparative 
and admonitory functions served by compensa-
tory damages has been explained as follows: 
The large portion of our tort law in which 
liability is dependent on fault can only be 
used to compensate plaintiffs when there are 
defendants deserving of punishment. As long 
as the liability with fault rules are retained, 
the law of torts will have an admonitory func-
tion even though the doctrine of punitive 
damages is abandoned. So punishment in 
tort actions is not anomalous (if anomalous 
only means unusual); and punitive damage 
practice is only one of many means of varying 
the size of money judgments in view of the 
admonitory function. The function itself is 
inherent in the liability with fault rules, and is 
not dependent on the allowance of punitive 
damages. Punitive damages are ordinarily 
merely a means of increasing the severity of 
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fashion, a claim for exemplary damages, 
while clearly designed to punish and deter, 
contemplates that the trier of fact will fix 
the award only after giving due considera-
tion to the severity of the injury perpetrat-
ed on the injured party by the wrongdoer. 
B. 
In 1986, as part of tort-reform legisla-
tion, the General Assembly modified the 
preexisting statutory scheme for exempla-
ry damages. Chap. 106, sec. 1, § 13-21-
102, 1986 Colo.Sess.Laws 675-76. Section 
13-21-102(l)(a), which substantially follows 
the initial Colorado exemplary damages 
statute enacted in 1889,5 see 1889 Colo. 
Sess.Laws 64-65, states as follows: 
In all civil actions in which damages are 
assessed by a jury for a wrong done to 
the person or to personal or real proper-
ty, and the injury complained of is at-
tended by circumstances of fraud, mal-
ice, or willful and wanton conduct, the 
jury, in addition to the actual damages 
sustained by such party, may award him 
reasonable exemplary damages. 
The term "willful and wanton conduct" is 
defined as conduct "purposefully commit-
ted which the actor must have realized as 
dangerous, done heedlessly and recklessly, 
without regard to consequences, or of the 
rights and safety of others, particularly the 
plaintiff." § 13-21-102(l)(b), 6A C.R.S. 
(1987). The 1986 statute states that the 
amount of reasonable exemplary damages 
"shall not exceed an amount which is equal 
to the amount of the actual damages 
the admonition of "compensatory" damages, 
and can only be criticized on that basis. 
C. Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 
Harv.L.Rev. 1173, 1177 (1931) (footnotes omit-
ted). 
5. Although exemplary damages were recognized 
at the common law as early as 1763, see Huckle 
v. Money, 2 Wils. 206 (K.B.I763), and the prac-
tice of awarding exemplary damages was well 
recognized when the United States Constitution 
was adopted, see Browning-Ferris Indus, of Ver-
mont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 
274, 109 S.Ct. 2909, 2919, 106 L.Ed.2d 219 
(1989), this court rejected the common law rule 
in Murphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541, 5 P. 119 (1884). 
In response to Hobbs, the General Assembly in 
1889 enacted a statute permitting an award of 
reasonable exemplary damages "for a wrong 
done to the person, or to personal or real prop-
awarded to the injured party." § 13-21-
102(l)(a), 6A C.R.S. (1987). In keeping 
with the somewhat interrelated functions 
served by both compensatory and exempla-
ry damages, however, the statutory scheme 
permits a court to increase an award of 
exemplary damages to a sum not to exceed 
three times the amount of actual damages 
if it is shown that the defendant during the 
pendency of the action has continued the 
injurious behavior against the plaintiff or 
others in a willful and wanton manner or 
has willfully and wantonly further aggra-
vated the damages to the plaintiff when 
the defendant knew or should have known 
that such action would produce aggrava-
tion. § 13-21-102(3)(a) & (b), 6A C.R.S. 
(1987).6 
The focal point of this case is section 13-
21-102(4), 6A C.R.S. (1987), which states: 
One-third of all reasonable damages col-
lected pursuant to this section shall be 
paid into the state general fund. The 
remaining two-thirds of such damages 
collected shall be paid to the injured par-
ty. Nothing in this subsection (4) shall 
be construed to give the general fund 
any interest in the claim for exemplary 
damages or in the litigation itself at any 
time prior to payment becoming due. 
By its plain terms, section 13-21-102(4) 
contemplates the entry, and the actual col-
lection, of a final judgment on behalf of the 
injured party, for it is only after the injured 
party has invested the time, effort, and 
expense of obtaining and actually collecting 
the judgment that the statutory grant of 
erty/' when the jury, in addition to awarding 
actual damages, finds that "the injury com-
plained of shall have been attended by circum-
stances of fraud, malice or insult, or a wanton 
and reckless disregard of the injured party's 
rights and feelings." 1889 Colo.Sess.Laws 64-
65. 
6. Section 13-21-102(2), 6A C.R.S. (1987), autho-
rizes a court to reduce or disallow exemplary 
damages to the extent that: 
(a) The deterrent effect of the damages has 
been accomplished; or 
(b) The conduct which resulted in the 
award has ceased; or 
(c) The purpose of such damages has other-
wise been served. 
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one-third interest to the state comes into property interest created in the judgment 
play. creditor by virtue of the judgment itself. 
C. 
[1] Property interests emanate from 
state law, and there is no question that 
under Colorado law a judgment for exem-
plary damages qualifies as a property in-
terest. 
The term "property" includes a multi-
plicity of interests and is commonly used 
to denote everything that is the subject 
of ownership, whether tangible or intan-
gible, as well as those rights and inter-
ests which have value to the owner. See 
Black's Law Dictionary 1095 (5th ed. 
1979). The concept of property, there-
fore, encompasses those enforceable con-
tractual rights that traditionally have 
been recognized as choses in action. 
Baker v. Young, 798 P.2d 889, 893 (Colo. 
1990). 
Because the term "property" includes a 
"legal right to damage for an injury," Ro-
sane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 370, 149 P.2d 
372, 375 (1944), it necessarily follows that 
the term "property" also includes the judg-
ment itself, which creates an independent 
legal right to full satisfaction from the 
"goods and chattels, lands, tenements, and 
real estate of every person against whom 
any judgment is obtained." § 13-52-
102(1), 6A C.R.S. (1987). The filing of a 
certified transcript of the judgment with 
the county clerk and recorder creates a 
"lien upon all the real property of such 
judgment debtor, not exempt from execu-
tion in such county, owned by him or which 
he may afterwards acquire until said lien 
expires." Id; see generally Evans v. City 
of Chicago, 689 F.2d 1286, 1296 (7th Cir. 
1982) (final judgment no longer subject to 
modification is vested property right); 
Truax-Traer Coal Co. v. Compensation 
Comm'r, 123 W.Va. 621, 17 S.E.2d 330, 334 
(1941) (judgment is "property" and as such 
is proper subject of constitutional protec-
tion). Indeed, the statutory disavowal in 
section 13-21-102(4) of any state interest in 
a claim for exemplary damages "at any 
time prior to payment becoming due" is an 
implicit legislative acknowledgement of the 
III. 
We next consider the concept of "taking" 
as it relates to the federal and state consti-
tutional proscriptions against the govern-
mental taking of private property without 
just compensation. The Fifth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution states in 
general terms that private property shall 
not "be taken for public use, without just 
compensation." This provision is made ap-
plicable to the states under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion. E.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. 
New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 122, 98 S.Ct. 
2646, 2658, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978). Article 
II, section 15 of the Colorado Constitution 
more specifically states that "[pjrivate 
property shall not be taken or damaged, for 
public or private use, without just compen-
sation" and that "the question whether the 
contemplated use be really public shall be a 
judicial question, and determined as such 
without regard to any legislative assertion 
that the use is public." 
A. 
The Taking Clause of both the federal 
and state constitutions is "designed to bar 
Government from forcing some people 
alone to bear public burdens which, in all 
fairness and justice, should be borne by the 
public as a whole." Penn Central Transp. 
Co., 438 U.S. at 123, 98 S.Ct at 2659; see 
also Board of County CommWs of Sa-
guache County v. Flickinger, 687 P.2d 
975, 983 (Colo.1984). Resolving the ques-
tion of "what constitutes a taking" is a 
problem of considerable difficulty, and 
courts have been unable "to develop any 
'set formula' for determining when 'justice 
and fairness* require that economic injuries 
caused by public action be compensated by 
the government, rather than remain dispro-
portionately concentrated on a few per-
sons." Flickinger, 687 P.2d at 983 (quot-
ing Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 
124, 98 S.Ct. at 2659); see Pennsylvania 
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415, 43 
S.Ct. 158, 160, 67 L.Ed. 322 (1922) (when 
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governmental regulation "goes too far it 2041, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980); Kaiser Aetna, 
will be recognized as a taking"). 444 U.S. at 175, 100 S.Ct. at 390. An 
[2] The determination of whether a additional factor, and one entitled to consid-
"taking" has occurred by reason of a gov- e r a b l e weight, is whether the property 
ernmental regulation interfering with or r i £ h t h a s ripened into a judgment. Where 
impairing the interest of a private property a private property interest emanates direct-
owner involves essentially an "ad hoc, fac- ft from a final judgment, the longstanding 
tual" analysis. Kaiser Aetna v. United rule, announced by the Supreme Court in 
States, 444 U.S. 164, 175, 100 S.Ct. 383, McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102, 
390, 62 L.Ed.2d 332 (1979). In resolving a 123-24, 19 S.Ct. 134, 141-42, 43 L.Ed. 382 
"taking" issue, the United States Supreme (1898), and consistently followed by other 
Court has considered the totality of circum- courts, is that such a property interest 
stances underlying the taking, including cannot be diminished by legislative fiat: 
such factors as the character of the gov- It is not within the power of a legislature 
ernmental action, its economic impact, and to take away rights which have been 
its interference with reasonable economic once vested by a judgment. Legislation 
expectations of the property owner. See may act on subsequent proceedings, may 
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co,, 467 U.S. abate actions pending, but when those 
986, 1005, 104 S.Ct. 2862, 2874, 81 L.Ed.2d actions have passed into judgment the 
815 (1984); Pruneyard Shopping Center power of the legislature to disturb the 
v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83, 100 S.Ct. 2035, rights created thereby ceases.^ 
7. The facts in McCullough prompted the United 
States Supreme Court to preface its opinion 
with the statement that "[pjerhaps no litigation 
has been more severely contested or has 
presented more intricate and troublesome ques-
tions than that which has arisen under the cou-
pon legislation of Virginia." 172 U.S. at 106, 19 
S.Ct. at 135. The basic facts in McCullough 
were as follows. In 1871 the Virginia Assembly 
passed an act for the refunding of the public 
debt. The act authorized the issuance of new 
coupon bonds for two-thirds of the old bonds, 
thereby leaving the other one-third as the basis 
of an equitable claim upon the state. The stat-
ute provided that "[t]he coupons shall be pay-
able semi-annually, and be receivable at and 
after maturity for all taxes, debts, dues and 
demands due the State, which shall be so ex-
pressed on their face." Id. at 103, 19 S.Ct. at 
134. Under the 1871 act, therefore, a large 
amount of the state's outstanding debt was re-
funded. The refunding scheme, however, 
proved to be unpopular, and after 1871 there 
was repeated legislation tending to mitigate the 
effects of the 1871 statute. In 1872 the Virginia 
Assembly passed a statute stating that it shall 
not be "lawful for the officers" charged with the 
collection of taxes or other demands of the 
State, due now or that shall hereafter become 
due, to receive in payment thereof anything else 
than gold or silver coin, United States Treasury 
notes, or notes of the national banks of the 
United States." Id. In a series of cases, the 
United States Supreme Court upheld state stat-
utes authorizing the payment of taxes in coupon 
bonds. Eg., Hartman v. Greenhow, 102 U.S. 
672, 26 L.Ed. 271 (1880); Antoni v. Greenhow, 
107 U.S. 769, 27 L.Ed. 468 (1882); Virginia Cou-
pon Cases, 114 U.S. 269, 5 S.Ct. 962, 29 L.Ed. 207 
(1885); Royall v. Virginia, 121 U.S. 102, 7 S.Ct. 
826, 30 L.Ed. 883 (1887); McGahey v. Virginia, 
135 U.S. 662, 10 S.Ct. 972 (1890). 
In 1882, the Virginia Assembly again passed a 
statute which, in effect, provided that a taxpayer 
seeking to use coupons in payment of his taxes 
should pay the taxes in money at the time of 
tendering the coupons and thereafter bring a 
suit to establish the genuineness of the coupons 
and that, if the suit be decided in the taxpayer's 
favor, the taxpayer would obtain from the trea-
surer a return of the money paid. The Virginia 
Assembly also passed in that year an act declar-
ing that tax collectors should receive in pay-
ment of taxes and other dues "gold, silver, Unit-
ed States Treasury notes, national bank curren-
cy and nothing else." Id. at 104. This statute 
also contained a provision permitting a lawsuit 
by one claiming that such exaction was illegal 
and also provided that there shall be no other 
remedy and no writ of mandamus or prohibi-
tion or any other writ or process shall issue to 
hinder or delay the collection of revenue. 
In 1892 McCullough filed an action in the 
Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk to establish 
the genuineness of certain coupons that he had 
tendered in payment of taxes. The action was 
commenced pursuant to the terms of the 1882 
statute, which authorized the filing of such an 
action as the exclusive remedy for one challeng-
ing the requirement that taxes be paid in gold, 
silver, or United States currency. McCullough 
sought to establish the genuineness of certain 
coupon bonds for the payment of his taxes. 
The Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk ren-
dered judgment in McCullough's favor, but in 
1894, after the judgment was rendered, the Vir-
ginia Assembly repealed the 1882 statute autho-
rizing the litigation commenced by McCullough. 
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See generally Hodges v. Snyder, 261 U.S. 
600, 603, 43 S.Ct. 435, 436, 67 L.Ed. 819 
(1923); Daylo v. Administrator of Veter-
ans' Affairs, 501 F.2d 811, 816 (D.C.Cir. 
1974); Bond Bros. v. Louisville & Jeffer-
son County Metropolitan Sewer Dist, 307 
Ky. 689, 211 S.W.2d 867, 873 (1948); Stone 
v. McKay Plumbing Co., 200 Miss. 792, 30 
So.2d 91, 92-93 (1947); Karrer v. Karrer, 
190 Neb. 610, 211 N.W.2d 116, 119 (1973); 
Inman v. Railroad Comm}n, 478 S.W.2d 
124, 128 (Tex.Civ.App.1972); City of Nor-
folk v. Stephenson, 185 Va. 305, 38 S.E.2d 
570, 575 (1946). 
B. 
Because a judgment for exemplary dam-
ages entitles the judgment creditor to a 
satisfaction out of the real and personal 
property of the judgment debtor, the tak-
ing of a money judgment from the judg-
ment creditor is substantially equivalent to 
the taking of money itself. In Webb's Fab-
ulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 
U.S. 155, 101 S.Ct. 446, 66 L.Ed.2d 358 
(1980), the Supreme Court considered the 
constitutionality of a state statute authoriz-
ing a county to take the interest accruing 
on an interpleader fund deposited into the 
registry of the county court under circum-
stances where another statute imposed a 
fee for the clerk's services in receiving the 
fund into the registry. The Court rejected 
the notion that the statute created a valid 
fee for services and held that the county's 
retention of the interest fund violated the 
Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
Acknowledging that a state may deny a 
property owner the beneficial use of prop-
erty or may restrict the owner's full exploi-
tation of property so long as such action is 
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia re-
versed the judgment in McCullough's favor, dis-
missed his petition, and awarded costs to the 
state. It was under this sequence of events that 
the United States Supreme Court held that the 
judgment rendered in the Circuit Court of the 
City of Norfolk pursuant to the 1882 act was 
rightfully entered and that the rights acquired 
by that judgment under the 1882 act could not 
be disturbed by the subsequent repeal of the 
statute in 1894. 
The rule adopted in McCullough applies to 
private property rights acquired under a judg-
ment and does not apply to an action to enforce 
justified as promoting the general welfare, 
the Court reasoned that the state had not 
merely adjusted the benefits and burdens 
of economic life to promote the common 
good, but had exacted "a forced contribu-
tion to general governmental revenues . . . 
not reasonably related to the costs of using 
the courts," 449 U.S. at 163, 101 S.Ct. at 
452, and then concluded: 
To put it another way: a State, by ipse 
dixit, may not transform private proper-
ty into public property without compen-
sation, even for the limited duration of 
the deposit in court. This is the very 
kind of thing that the Taking Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment was meant to pre-
vent. That Clause stands as a shield 
against the arbitrary use of governmen-
tal power. 
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, 449 U.S. at 
164, 101 S.Ct. at 452. 
In contrast to Webb's Fabulous Pharma-
cies, the Court in United States v. Sperry 
Corp., 493 U.S. 52, 110 S.Ct. 387, 107 
L.Ed.2d 290 (1989), found no unconstitu-
tional taking of money under a federal 
statute that required the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York to deduct llh% from the 
first $5 million dollars of an arbitration 
award entered by the Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal. The purpose of the statu-
tory deduction was to reimburse the United 
States government for the expenses in-
curred in the administration of the arbitra-
tion program. Acknowledging that the 
amount of a user fee need not "be precisely 
calibrated to the use that a party makes of 
government services," the Court concluded 
that the statutory deductions were not "so 
clearly excessive as to belie their purported 
character as user fees," stating: 
a public right. An action to enforce a public 
right, "even after it has been established by the 
judgment of the court, may be annulled by 
subsequent legislation and should not be there-
after enforced; although, in so far as a private 
right has been incidentally established by such 
judgment, as for special damages to the plaintiff 
or for his costs, it may not be thus taken away." 
Hodges v. Snyder, 261 U.S. 600, 603-04, 43 S.Ct. 
435, 436-37, 67 L.Ed. 819 (1923); see Atlantic 
City Casino Assoc, v. City of Atlantic City, 217 
NJ.Super. 277, 525 A.2d 1109, 1113 (1985); City 
of Norfolk v. Stephenson, 185 Va. 305, 38 S.E.2d 
570, 575 (1946). 
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This is not a situation where the Govern- for exemplary damages is designed to pun-
ment has appropriated all, or most, of the ish the wrongdoer and deter similar con-
award to itself and labeled the booty as a duct by others, it is only available when a 
user fee We need not state what civil wrong has been committed under ex-
percentage of the award would be too tremely aggravating circumstances and 
great a take to qualify as a user fee, for when the injured party has a successful 
we are convinced that on the facts of this claim for actual damages against the 
case, 1V2% does not qualify as a "taking" wrongdoer. Harding Glass Co., Inc., 640 
by any standard of excessiveness. P.2d at 112. In that sense, an exemplary 
110 S.Ct. at 394-95 (citations and footnote damages award is not totally devoid of any 
omitted). and all reparative elements. More impor-
[3] The rule to be gleaned from Webb's ^ ^ t h e f o r c e d c o n t r i b u t i o n o f o n e " t h i r d 
Fabulous Pharmacies and Sparry is that, o f t h e exemplary damages judgment is im-
in order to withstand a constitutional dial- P o s e d n o t o n t h e d e f e n d a n t wrongdoer who 
lenge to a governmental appropriation of a c a u s e d t h e i n J u r i e s b u t u P o n t h e P l a i n t i f f 
significant part of a money judgment under w h o suffered the wrong. It goes without 
the Taking Clause of the United States saying that placing the burden of payment 
Constitution, the governmental appropria- o n t h e Judgment creditor who suffered the 
tion must bear a reasonable relationship to w r o n S b e a r s n o reasonable relationship to 
the governmental services provided to civil a n y arguable goal of punishing the wrong-
litigants in making use of the judicial pro- d o e r o r deterring others from engaging in 
cess for the purpose of resolving the civil s i m i l a r conduct. Cf Bankers Life & Casu-
claim resulting in the judgment. We adopt altV Co> v- Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 108 
that rule as the controlling norm for resolv- S C t - 1645> 1 0 ° L-Ed.2d 62 (1988) (statutory 
ing the taking issue in this case. imposition of 15% penalty on party who 
unsuccessfully appeals money judgment 
IV. upheld on basis that means chosen were 
[4] We turn to Kirk's claim that the sufficiently related to state's interest in 
requirement of section 13-21-102(4) that he discouraging frivolous appeals to satisfy 
pay to the state general fund one-third of E<*ual Protection Clause), 
all exemplary damages collected on his
 [ M J Section 13-21-102(4) does not sat 
judgment constitutes a taking of private
 i s f y t h e c r i t e r i a {m a n ad valormi p r o p e r . 
property without just compensation in vio-
 t y tex W h e r 6 ( M h e r e > a 8 t a t u t e , g o b v i o u s 
lation of the Taking Clause of the United
 p u r p o s e ^ to p r o d u c e r e v e n u e for t h e g t a t e 
States and Colorado Constitutions. Al- general fund, the statute must conform to 
though several types of revenue-raising the state constitutional requirement that all 
and regulatory measures are available to a
 texes u p o n e a c h o f t h e v a r i o u s d a s s e s o f 
legislative body, we believe it will be help-
 r e a , a n d p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y b e «uniform>. 
ful to briefly explain why the forced contri-
 a n d b e ] e v i e d u n d e r g e n e r a ] l a w g p r e s c r i b . 
bution of section 13-21-102(4) fails to satis-
 i n g s u c h r e g u i a t ions as shall secure just 
fy the legal criteria for any of these mea-
 a n d e q u a l v a l u a t i o n s o f a l l p r o p e r ty , wheth-
s u r e s
* er real or personal. Colo. Const, art. X, 
[5] Section 13-21-102(4) does not quali- § 3. In Walker v. Bedford, 93 Colo. 400, 
fy as a valid penalty or forfeiture. The 26 P.2d 1051 (1933), this court invalidated a 
Colorado exemplary damages statute, we statute which imposed an additional regis-
have held, is not a penal statute in the tration fee upon motor vehicles based on 
sense of creating a new and distinct cause their value. In so holding, we emphasized 
of action for a civil penalty, but instead that the purpose of the statute was to raise 
"merely authorizes increased damages an- general revenues but was applicable only 
ciliary to an independent claim for actual to motor vehicles and to no other kinds of 
damages." Palmer, 684 P.2d at 214. As personal property. Walker, 93 Colo, at 
we previously observed, while a judgment 405-06, 26 P.2d at 1053. In similar fash-
ion, section 13-21-102(4) 
raise revenues for the state general fund, 
but is limited only to personal property in 
the form of a judgment for exemplary dam-
ages and has no applicability at all to any 
other form of private property, real or per-
sonal. 
[8] Section 13-21-102(4) does not quali-
fy as a valid excise tax. In contrast to a 
direct tax on property, an excise tax is not 
based on the assessed value of the property 
subject to the tax, but rather is imposed on 
a particular act, event, or occurrence. 
Bloom v. City of Fort Collins, 784 P.2d 
304, 307 (Colo. 1989); Walker, 93 Colo, at 
403-07, 26 P.2d at 1052-53. "The object of 
an excise tax, like that of an ad valorem 
property tax, is to provide revenue for the 
general expenses of government, but, un-
like the ad valorem property tax, the pay-
ment of the excise tax is made a condition 
precedent to the act, event, or occurrence 
on which the tax is based." Bloom, 784 
P.2d at 307-08; see Cherry Hills Farms, 
Inc. v. City of Cherry Hills Village, 670 
P.2d 779, 782 (Colo. 1983). Even if we as-
sume that an excise tax on a money judg-
ment could survive a constitutional chal-
lenge under article II, section 6, of the 
Colorado Constitution, which mandates 
that justice "be administered without sale," 
section 13-21-102(4) imposes the burden of 
payment not on all persons using the civil 
justice system, nor for that matter on all 
successful plaintiffs, but only on those 
plaintiffs who obtain a judgment for exem-
plary damages and then only when the 
award is collected. An excise tax imposed 
only on such a limited class of persons 
exercising their right to use the courts, 
while other persons exercising the same 
right are not subject to the tax, would be 
so underinclusive as not to withstand even 
the rational-basis standard of review under 
equal protection analysis. See generally 
Tassian v. People, 731 P.2d 672 (Colo.1987) 
(chief judge's directive prohibiting pro se 
litigants from paying filing fees by person-
al check violative of equal protection of 
laws under Colorado Constitution). 
[9] The only conceivable justification 
for section 13-21-102(4) is that it consti-
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is designed to tutes a user fee imposed on plaintiffs who 
successfully utilize the civil justice system 
in obtaining an exemplary damages award. 
A user fee is in the nature of a special fee 
designed to defray the cost of a govern-
mental service and is imposed on the users 
of that service. See generally Bloom, 784 
P.2d at 308; Loup-Miller Constr. Co. v. 
City and County of Denver, 676 P.2d 
1170, 1174-75 (Colo.1984). A valid user fee 
need not be designed with mathematical 
precision to defray the cost of the service 
for which the fee is imposed, but must bear 
some reasonable relationship to the overall 
cost of that service. Bloom, 784 P.2d at 
308; Loup-Miller Constr. Co., 676 P.2d at 
1175-76. 
[10] Section 13-21-102(4) fails to quali-
fy as a valid user fee. The payment re-
quired of the judgment creditor under sec-
tion 13-21-102(4) is not allocated to the 
cost of funding the civil justice system, nor 
are the funds earmarked for a specific pur-
pose remotely connected with the judicial 
process. In a manner similar to the statu-
tory taking of interest on an interpleader 
fund invalidated in Webb's Fabulous Phar-
macies, 449 U.S. 155, 101 S.Ct. 446, section 
13-21-102(4) exacts a forced contribution in 
order to provide general governmental rev-
enues and does so in a manner and to a 
degree not reasonably related to the cost of 
using the courts. The consideration re-
ceived by judgment creditors subject to the 
forced contribution created by section 13-
21-102(4) is the use of the courts in resolv-
ing their civil disputes. The General As-
sembly, however, has imposed filing fees 
and other fees on persons using the civil 
justice system in order to defray a signifi-
cant part of the costs in funding that as-
pect of the judicial process. See §§ 13-32-
101 to -104, 6A C.R.S. (1987 & 1990 Supp.); 
§ 13-71-144, 6A C.R.S. (1990 Supp.). Sec-
tion 13-21-102(4) thus has the effect of 
forcing a select group of citizens—persons 
who obtain a judgment for exemplary dam-
ages and are successful in collecting on the 
judgment—to bear a disproportionate bur-
den of funding the operations of state 
government, which, "in all fairness and jus-
tice, should be borne by the public as a 
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whole." Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, 
Inc., 449 U.S. at 163, 101 S.Ct. at 452. 
The fact that a legislative body might 
choose to eliminate exemplary damages in 
civil cases without offending due process of 
law is not to say that any restriction what-
ever on an exemplary damages award will 
pass constitutional muster. See Pacific 
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, — 
U.S. , , 111 S.Ct. 1032, 1054, 113 
L.Ed.2d 1 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). In 
our view, forcing a judgment creditor to 
pay to the state general fund one-third of a 
judgment for exemplary damages in order 
to fund services which have already been 
funded by other revenue-raising measures, 
and without conferring on the judgment 
creditor any benefit or service not fur-
nished to other civil litigants not required 
to make the same contribution, amounts to 
an unconstitutional taking of the judgment 
creditor's property in violation of the Tak-
ing Clause of the United States and the 
Colorado Constitutions. Cf Ochs v. Town 
of Hot Sulphur Springs, 158 Colo. 456, 
461-62, 407 P.2d 677, 680 (1965) (enforce-
ment of municipal "frontage tax" on real 
property without any corresponding benefit 
to property results in "taking private prop-
erty without compensation, and without 
due process of law").8 
In urging us to uphold the constitutional-
ity of section 13-21-102(4), the Attorney 
General argues that no taking occurs at all 
because a judgment creditor does not have 
a property interest in one-third of the judg-
ment for exemplary damages. We find 
this argument devoid of merit. 
[11] The legislature may well abate or 
diminish a pending civil action, but when 
that claim ripens into judgment "the power 
of the legislature to disturb the rights cre-
ated thereby ceases." McCullough, 172 
U.S. at 123-24, 19 S.Ct. at 141-142. Sec-
8. The only case we have found dealing with a 
statutory provision similar to section 13-21-
102(4) is McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 
RSupp. 1563 (M.D.Ga.1990). In that case, the 
court held that section 51-12-5.1(e)(2) of the 
Georgia Tort Reform Act of 1987, which autho-
tion 13-21-102(4) passes the line of consti-
tutional propriety by taking one-third of a 
collected civil judgment for exemplary dam-
ages notwithstanding the fact that the 
state has affirmatively disavowed, pursu-
ant to the statute itself, "any interest in 
the claim for exemplary damages or in the 
litigation itself at any time prior to the 
payment becoming due." Such statutory 
taking of one-third of the collected judg-
ment is direct and absolute, and its econom-
ic impact cannot be described as anything 
less than substantial. 
To be sure, section 13-21-102(4) purports 
to create a state interest in one-third of the 
monies collected on the judgment and in 
that respect arguably might be read to 
defeat any reasonable economic expecta-
tion on the part of the judgment creditor to 
the total judgment. The statutory repudia-
tion of any state interest in the tort litiga-
tion or in the judgment itself, however, 
affirmatively belies any notion that the 
judgment creditor's property interest in the 
judgment is less than total. Given the 
legislative disaffirmance of any stake in 
the exemplary damages award prior to col-
lection, it would border on the fanciful 
were we to characterize the judgment cred-
itor's expectation to a full satisfaction of 
the judgment as unreasonable, especially 
since upon entry of the judgment there is 
no preexisting claim on the part of the 
state to any part of the judgment. The 
state's asserted interest is not in the judg-
ment itself but in the monies collected on 
the judgment, and that interest arises only 
at a point in time after the judgment credi-
tor's property interest in the judgment has 
vested by operation of law. Moreover, the 
judgment itself results exclusively from 
the judgment creditor's time, effort, and 
expense in the litigation process without 
any assistance whatever from the state. 
We need not turn this case, however, on 
a judgment creditor's reasonable economic 
expectation of a property interest in the 
rized the state's taking of seventy-five percent of 
all punitive damages in products liability cases, 
was not rationally related to a legitimate state 
interest because the state provided no quid pro 
quo for the taking. 737 FSupp. at 1575-77. 
total judgment. We are 
even if the expectation issue is viewed as a 
close one, the cumulative effect of all 
factors bearing on the "taking" issue 
weighs heavily on the side of a constitu-
tionally protected private property interest 
on the part of the judgment creditor in the 
exemplary damages award. These factors, 
as previously noted, include the following: 
the legislative renunciation of any interest 
in the judgment prior to collection; the 
absence of any demonstrable nexus be-
tween, on the one hand, any alleged gov-
ernmental interest in punishing and deter-
ring fraudulent, malicious, or willful and 
wanton tortious conduct and, on the other, 
the statutory imposition of the forced con-
tribution on the person injured by the 
wrongful conduct; and the gross dispropor-
tion between the statutory forced contribu-
tion and any governmental service made 
available to the judgment creditor but not 
otherwise funded by fees and other statu-
tory assessments imposed on civil litigants 
using the judicial process to resolve their 
disputes. We thus conclude that section 
13-21-102(4) constitutes a taking of a judg-
ment creditor's private property interest in 
an exemplary damages award without just 
compensation in violation of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution and Article II, section 
15, of the Colorado Constitution. 
We accordingly reverse that part of the 
district court's judgment upholding the con-
stitutionality of section 13-21-102(4), and 
we remand the case to that court with 
directions to conform its judgment to the 
views herein stated. 
ROVIRA, C.J., dissents. 
LOHR, J., joins in the dissent. 
Chief Justice ROVIRA dissenting: 
The majority holds that section 13-21-
102(4), 6A C.R.S. (1987), results in a forced 
taking of a judgment creditor's property in 
violation of both the United States and 
Colorado Constitutions. Because I believe 
that a claim for exemplary damages is 
purely a statutory right and such a claim 
may be limited or conditioned by the legis-
lature, no taking of a property right results 
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satisfied that, when an award of exemplary damages has 
been obtained pursuant to the statute. Ac-
cordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
Based on plaintiffs claim for malicious 
prosecution against the Denver Publishing 
Company, a jury awarded him exemplary 
damages in the amount of $160,500. At 
the time plaintiff brought his claim, section 
13-21-102(4) was in effect and provided 
that one-third of any exemplary damages 
award collected must be paid to the state 
general fund. In addition, section 13-21-
102(l)(a) provided that exemplary damages 
should not exceed the amount of actual 
damages unless exceptional circumstances 
justify an increase. §§ 13-21-102(l)(a) and 
13-21-102(3), 6A C.R.S. (1987). In order to 
comply with the statute, plaintiff requested 
that his exemplary damages award be re-
duced so as not to exceed the amount of 
actual damages awarded. Pursuant to his 
request, the trial court reduced the exem-
plary damages award to $118,980. Plain-
tiff also requested the trial court to find 
section 13-21-102(4) unconstitutional. The 
trial court refused. 
On appeal plaintiff contends that the leg-
islative requirement that a portion of an 
exemplary damages judgment actually col-
lected be paid into the state's general fund 
is an unconstitutional taking of property. 
Although plaintiff has raised other consti-
tutional issues, the majority relies only on 
the "taking" issue in arriving at the conclu-
sion that the statute is unconstitutional. 
II 
The majority reasons that the entire 
judgment for exemplary damages is a prop-
erty interest of the plaintiff and that if the 
state takes a portion such taking is uncon-
stitutional. 
To arrive at this conclusion, the majority 
examines the nature of an award for exem-
plary damages, and finds that compensato-
ry damages and exemplary damages are 
related and dependent on one another, both 
having similar reparative functions. Com-
pensatory damages serve a primary repara-
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tive function of making the injured party 
whole, while exemplary damages, although 
designed to punish and deter, contemplate 
the severity of the injury perpetrated on 
the injured party by the wrongdoer as well, 
thus also serving a reparative function. 
Because the term property includes a 
"legal right to damage for an injury," it 
follows that the term property includes the 
judgment itself. Maj. op. at 267 (quoting 
Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 370, 149 
P.2d 372, 375 (1944)). According to the 
majority, because section 13-21-102(4) con-
templates the entry and actual collection of 
a final judgment before the statutory grant 
of one-third interest to the state comes into 
play, the state is taking a property interest, 
violating the Fifth Amendment of the Unit-
ed States Constitution and article II, sec-
tion 15 of the Colorado Constitution. 
I do not dispute that a judgment is a 
property right. I also agree that a "tak-
ing" of a judgment without compensation 
would be unconstitutional. I disagree how-
ever, based upon facts and law applicable 
to this case, that the plaintiff has a right to 
the entire exemplary damages judgment. 
My disagreement is premised on the 
ground that a claim for exemplary dam-
ages is a statutory right which may be 
conditioned by the legislature and thus the 
entire judgment never vested in the plain-
tiff. 
Exemplary damages were authorized by 
statute to punish and deter conduct attend-
ed by circumstances of fraud, malice or 
willful and wanton conduct. 1889 Colo. 
Sess.Laws 64-65 Although exemplary 
damages may have a negligible reparative 
function, it is well-established in Colorado 
that punishment and deterrence is the es-
sential purpose of exemplary damages. 
Seaward Constr. Co., Inc. v. Bradley, 817 
P.2d 971, 974 (Colo.1991); Mince v. But-
ters, 200 Colo. 501, 616 P.2d 127 (1980); 
French v. Deane, 19 Colo. 504, 511, 36 P. 
609 (1894). The effort by the majority to 
establish a link between actual and exem-
plary damages due to their reparative func-
tions is tenuous at best. 
The uniqueness of exemplary damages is 
also demonstrated in the statute authoriz-
ing such damages. First, the wrong giving 
rise to exemplary damages must be attend-
ed by circumstances of fraud, malice, or 
willful and wanton conduct. Second, the 
amount of an exemplary damages award 
may not exceed the actual damages award-
ed without circumstances justifying an in-
crease. Third, the court may reduce an 
exemplary damages award if the deterrent 
effect has been accomplished or if the pur-
pose has been served. §§ 13-21-102(l)(a), 
(2)(a), & (c), 6A C.R.S. (1987). Finally, a 
claim for exemplary damages must be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, while 
compensatory damages may be proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence. One has a 
right to compensatory damages when one 
has suffered an injury, but exemplary dam-
ages are allowed only in very limited cir-
cumstances. 
The two remedies may be interrelated, as 
the majority opinion suggests, but a claim 
for exemplary damages is unique and 
should not be viewed as a legal right which 
is any greater than that provided by stat-
ute. 
Since a claim for exemplary damages 
arises from statute, such a claim may also 
be limited by statute. Kaitz v. District 
Court, 650 P.2d 553, 556 (Colo.1982). If 
the legislature may completely eliminate 
exemplary damages in civil cases, as the 
majority concedes, the legislature may also 
place conditions on a statutory grant of 
authority to recover such damages. The 
plaintiff recognized that the right to exem-
plary damages is a statutory right, and 
that right is subject to legislative condi-
tions. Plaintiff accepted the condition pur-
suant to section 13-21-102(l)(a) which pro-
vides that exemplary damages must not 
exceed the amount of actual damages, 
when he requested that the exemplary 
damages award be reduced from $160,500 
to $118,980. Thus, plaintiff concedes that 
exemplary damages may be limited by the 
legislature. 
The legislature cannot modify a judg-
ment which is a property right, but the 
legislature is free to condition a claim for 
exemplary damages which is allowed only 
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pursuant to a statutory grant.1 "It is true 
that the legislature can not pass an act 
depriving a citizen of any vested right, but 
to be a vested right, *[i]t must be some-
thing more than a mere expectation based 
upon an anticipated continuance of the ex-
isting law. It must have become a title, 
legal or equitable, to the present or future 
enjoyment of property — ' " Smith v. 
Hill, 12 I11.2d 588, 592, 147 N.E.2d 321, 325 
(1958) (quoting People ex rel Foote v. 
Clark, 283 111. 221, 222, 119 N.E. 329, 330 
(1918)). The Illinois court went on to hold 
that a plaintiff is entitled to a cause of 
action for damages actually sustained, but 
a vested right to exemplary damages arises 
only when such damages have been al-
lowed by a judgment. "There being no 
vested right in any plaintiff to exemplary, 
punitive, vindictive or aggravated damages 
the legislature may therefore restrict or 
deny the allowance of such damages at its 
will." Smith, 147 N.E.2d at 325. 
Any property right plaintiff may have in 
the award is limited as provided by the 
statute. When the statute became effec-
tive, plaintiff had a "mere expectancy" in a 
possible future exemplary damage award. 
This expectancy was conditioned by one-
third going to the state, and plaintiff was 
aware of this at the time he filed his com-
plaint.2 
Section 13-21-102(4) repudiates any state 
interest in the tort litigation and prevents 
collection by the state until the plaintiff 
has collected the exemplary damages judg-
ment. The majority reasons that this stat-
utory provision supports its conclusion that 
the judgment creditor has a full property 
interest in the entire exemplary damages 
award. I disagree. The legislature, by 
that provision, has sought to protect the 
plaintiffs interests by conditioning the 
state's right to receive payment until the 
judgment has been collected. Since the 
state is only entitled to receive its portion 
of the exemplary damages award after col-
lection has been successful, the plaintiff is 
not harmed. 
The majority is concerned that the 
"forced contribution of one-third of the ex-
emplary damages judgment is imposed not 
on the defendant wrongdoer . . . but upon 
the plaintiff who suffered the wrong." 
Maj. op. at 270. I disagree. There is mini-
mal burden placed on the plaintiff where, 
as here, the plaintiff had a mere expectan-
cy in exemplary damages, and where only a 
portion of that received is contributed to 
the state. Furthermore, the state's receipt 
of one-third of an exemplary damages judg-
ment does not negate the punishment of 
the wrongdoer. The wrongdoer must pay 
the entire exemplary damages judgment 
regardless of who receives it. 
It is not unreasonable for the legislature 
to condition an exemplary damage award 
where the purpose behind exemplary dam-
ages is to punish the wrongdoer and deter 
dangerous or malicious conduct. The legis-
lature has recognized that exemplary dam-
ages are allowed for the benefit of the 
public. In exercising its legislative powers, 
the legislature appropriately decided that 
the goal of benefitting society through ex-
emplary damages awards required a por-
tion of exemplary damages awards be paid 
to the state. 
1. Non-economic damages have also been limit-
ed by statute in order to prevent undue burden 
on economic, commercial, and personal wel-
fare. § 13-21-102.5, 6A C.R.S. (1987). 
2. Expressed alternatively, a plaintiffs property 
right in a judgment for punitive damages is 
As I do not believe that the statute vio-
lates the taking clause of either the Colora-
do or the United States Constitutions, I am 
confronted with the other constitutional 
claims not addressed in the majority opin-
ion.3 Because the majority reverses on the 
intrinsically subject to partial defeasance upon 
collection by reason of the statutory scheme in 
place at the time of entry of judgment. A plain-
tiff receives the full benefit of the property right 
so described; there is no taking. 
3. See maj. op. at 265 n. 3. 
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taking clause issue it would serve no I am authorized to state that JUSTICE 
worthwhile purpose to consider the other LOHR joins in this dissent, 
constitutional issues raised by the plaintiff. Yw\ 
I respectfully dissent. £ l K i X i ^ 
